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SECOND AMENDMENT BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES AND
HELLER’S SENSITIVE PLACES
Adam B. Sopko*

ABSTRACT
Judges and commentators have widely acknowledged that history enjoys a privileged status in Second Amendment cases, but its precise role is undertheorized and
rarely controls case outcomes. In particular, courts have been unable to decide
“sensitive places” cases—challenges to location-based gun laws—in a manner that
adheres to Supreme Court precedent because existing Second Amendment doctrine
lacks a test for sensitive places cases that uses history and tradition in a principled way.
This Article proposes a solution to address that problem.
An untapped source of guidance is the Court’s takings jurisprudence. Interpreting
their respective constitutional provisions, Justice Scalia observed that both property
rights and the right to keep and bear arms are fundamental rights that prefigure ratification. Specifically, Scalia observed, both the Second Amendment and the Takings
Clause rely upon bright-line rules subject to a location-based exception, require the
use of history and tradition in their respective analyses, and deal with property interests. In several important cases—including Heller and McDonald—the Court has
indicated that the right to keep and bear arms is animated by property-like principles.
This suggests the Court’s well-established takings jurisprudence is a more germane
source to inform its less-developed sensitive places doctrine than the sources scholars
and judges currently look to, such as free speech doctrine.
This Article explores what the Court’s takings jurisprudence can teach us about the
constitutionality of location-based gun laws. I propose a framework for courts to analyze sensitive places cases by borrowing from doctrine that is more familiar to courts,
but similarly governs a pre-constitutional, individual right. My examination of the
Court’s takings doctrine indicates that the role of history and tradition in analyzing
a fundamental right, like the right to keep and bear arms, is more elastic than many
assume—but that history and tradition should play a larger role than it currently does.
* JD Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. I would like to thank Eric
Ruben for his invaluable guidance and mentorship with this project and more. Thanks to Jake
Charles, Professor Zachary Clopton, and Mark Frassetto for helpful comments and suggestions.
This project also benefited from conversations with Professors Sam Bray, Saul Cornell,
Catherine Lacroix, and Jim Pfander. Thanks also to Sarah Alexander for her willingness to listen
to the many ideas that made it into this Article as well as those that did not, and for her unending
love and support. And sincere thanks to Nikhil Edward, Meagan Flora, Ethan Gaitz, Andrew
Grindstaff, Elizabeth Harte, George Townsend and the rest of the editors of the William & Mary
Bill of Rights Journal for their exceptional editorial assistance in improving this project.
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INTRODUCTION
In the final week of its term, the Supreme Court released an opinion that reinterpreted the Constitution and, with it, disturbed over a century of tradition and
precedent.1 Writing for a Court split along ideological lines, Justice Scalia announced
a new conception of an individual, natural right.2 Scalia framed the right in categorical terms; however, he cautioned that the rule-like conception was not absolute, but
could be subject to a few exceptions.3 He observed that the proper analysis, to determine whether the right—under the Court’s novel interpretation—was violated or a
challenged law fell into an exception, was to look to the right’s historical understanding.4 In some ways, the Court’s property rights decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council5 presaged its ruling in the landmark Second Amendment case, District
of Columbia v. Heller,6 fifteen years later.
In Heller, the Court announced for the first time that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms.7 Heller’s holding was not entirely
consistent with the preceding centuries of precedent.8 Indeed, in many ways, Heller
1

See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
See id. at 1019.
3
Id. at 1027–32.
4
See id. at 1029.
5
Id. at 1003.
6
(Heller I) 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
7
Id. at 595.
8
See Jason Racine, What the Hell(er)? The Fine Print Standard of Review Under Heller,
29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 605, 605–06 (2009) (“Up until 2001, all of the federal circuit courts that
2
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announced a new constitutional right. The novel interpretation conceived of a right
governed by bright-line rules. However, as in Lucas, Justice Scalia made clear that this
newfound right was “not unlimited,” but was subject to several exceptions.9 One of
those exceptions—the subject of this Article—was a location-based carve-out: “sensitive places.”10 This exception to Scalia’s bright-line rule holds that certain places exist
where the Second Amendment right does not extend, due to their sensitivity.11 Scalia
provided two examples of sensitive places—“schools and government buildings”—
but no reasoning as to what makes a place sensitive or why schools and government
buildings in particular are sensitive.12 Rather, the Court simply observed that the proper
Second Amendment analysis generally is one that looks to history and tradition.13
Unsurprisingly, many lower courts have struggled to apply the Court’s holding.14
In sensitive places cases in particular, some courts have attempted to engage with
had ruled on the meaning interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting either a collective
right that did not apply to individuals or a sophisticated collective right that only applied individually to people linked to state militias.”); see also Richard Posner, In Defense of Looseness,
NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness
[https://perma.cc/4P3D-6LRB] (“For more than two centuries the ‘right’ to private possession
of guns . . . had lain dormant.”).
9
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626. Specifically, the Court observed that:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose. . . . [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
Id. at 626–27.
10
See id.
11
The reading of Heller’s exceptions that I adopt—interpreting the Second Amendment
to not extend to certain people, places, and acts—enjoys support in the literature. See, e.g., Allen
Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 703, 710 (2012). That is, those people, places, and acts are outside the Second
Amendment’s scope. However, there is another reading of Heller’s exceptions: that laws
governing the exceptions will likely pass muster under any level of scrutiny, but the Second
Amendment right nevertheless still reaches those people, places, and acts. That reading views
those people, places, and acts as being beyond the Second Amendment’s protection. See,
e.g., David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment
Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 223–26 (2017). The debate is not settled and is beyond
the scope of this project.
12
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
13
See id. at 626–27.
14
See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
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history or tradition, however, even in those instances, the analysis is typically unprincipled and lacks a clear framework.15 Worse still, most lower courts avoid history
and tradition altogether and instead rely on doctrinal tools that are more familiar and
well-practiced than “doing history.”16 Accordingly, the “prevailing approach,” a
two-part decision structure, has not allowed courts to develop doctrine to govern the
sensitive places exception.17 The two-part framework asks first whether the Second
Amendment right is implicated by the challenged law.18 If the Second Amendment
is implicated, then, at Step Two, the court asks whether the particular Second Amendment conduct is protected in the particular instance.19 Beyond straightforward cases that
allow a court to strictly adhere to Heller’s “schools and government buildings,” most
courts assume without deciding the initial scope question and jump straight to Step
Two.20 Absent clear guidance or some rules of decision, it is not surprising that federal
judges look to a more familiar method—i.e., tiers of scrutiny—to resolve Second
Amendment cases.21 This Article seeks to merge these two concepts. I endeavor to
provide a potential solution for sensitive places cases that adheres to Heller’s doctrinal
prescription in a form that is familiar to federal judges by borrowing from a wellestablished area of constitutional law.
The Second Amendment’s sensitive places exception shares doctrinal principles
with another exception to a constitutional right: the Takings Clause’s nuisance exception. Like the property right, the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental,
individual right that, according to the Court, prefigures ratification.22 Both sensitive
places and nuisance are exceptions to the rule that the substantive right cannot be
eliminated.23 Both exceptions are location-based. An individual cannot bear arms in
15

See, e.g., Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471–73.
See Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine,
80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 163 (2017) (“[O]riginalism has not been the primary means
of deciding cases.”).
17
Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700
F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (referring to the two-part test as “the prevailing approach”);
see also JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 120 (2018).
18
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 110.
19
See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 11, at 212–13.
20
See, e.g., Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 2015) (collapsing
the two-part test into one); United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding
a post office parking lot is a “government building” for the purposes of Heller and thus a
sensitive place).
21
See Armed in America, LIVE AM. TOWN HALL at 29:00 (Aug. 27, 2019), https://constitu
tioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/podcast/armed-in-america [https://perma.cc/XM3Y
-9AG6] (describing the role of borrowing in fashioning decision rules).
22
See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
23
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that the Takings Clause
protects property rights against “total takings” which deprive the landowner of all economic
value, unless the nuisance exception is triggered).
16
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a given place because it is sensitive; similarly, one cannot use their property in a
particular way in a certain place because it constitutes a nuisance.24
As Justice Scalia held in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the nuisance
exception requires a threshold inquiry into the history and tradition of nuisance law
in a given state.25 Since the Court decided Lucas, judges have developed a rich body
of takings doctrine with which they are familiar.26 Moreover, the analysis they would
engage in focuses on history and tradition, rather than freestanding balancing.27
The Second Amendment is the subject of a growing academic literature, however the “sensitive places” exception has received relatively little scholarly attention.
To be sure, I am not the first to recognize the overlap between property principles
and the right to keep and bear arms,28 or the Takings Clause and the Second Amendment.29 However, this Article is the first attempt to prescribe a definitive, administrable
test that comports with Heller’s doctrinal rules and draws on existing location-based
constitutional principles.
Most sensitive places scholarship looks to the First Amendment for doctrinal
guidance or as an analogical source.30 Some entries in the conversation argue a place’s
sensitivity turns on its level of security and nature of ownership—i.e., public or private.31 Still others argue that sensitive places doctrine should effectively be distilled
into heightened scrutiny in most all cases.32 However, no one has examined the Second
24

See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–29.
505 U.S. at 1027.
26
See generally Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of Lucas Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847 (2017)
(discussing the effect Lucas has had on regulatory takings doctrine in the lower courts).
27
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–31; Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
28
See Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308 (2019); John Schwab & Thomas G.
Sprankling, Houston, We Have a Problem: Does the Second Amendment Create a Property
Right to a Specific Firearm?, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 158, 158–59 (2012); John G.
Sprankling, Property and the Roberts Court, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7–11 (2016).
29
See Blocher, supra note 28, at 331–41.
30
See Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and
“Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537 (2014) (prescribing a sensitive places analysis
that looks at the strength of an individual’s First Amendment rights in the particular place
at issue to calibrate the level of protection on their right to bear arms there); Amy Hetzner,
Comment, Where Angels Tread: Gun-Free School Zone Laws and an Individual Right to
Bear Arms, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 374–81 (2011) (analogizing sensitive places to the First
Amendment’s “time, place, and manner” restrictions); Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns
at Home: The Constitutionality of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J. 175, 182 (2018) (borrowing from the First Amendment’s expressive
conduct doctrine to determine whether a place is sensitive under the Second Amendment).
31
See Brian C. Whitman, Comment, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller's Second Amendment in Sensitive Places, 81 MISS. L.J. 1987, 1988–91 (2012).
32
See David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine:
Locational Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 205, 287 (2019).
25
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Amendment’s sensitive places exception as a location-based exception to a fundamental
constitutional right, through the Court’s property rights doctrine. In that sense this
Article is a novel contribution to Second Amendment scholarship and the sensitive
places conversation in particular.
This Article proceeds in five parts. It begins in Part I by discussing the ways
courts have analyzed sensitive places challenges and concludes that extant methods
are not conducive to developing a coherent sensitive places doctrine. Part II summarizes the nuisance exception to regulatory takings doctrine. Part III discusses how
courts frequently rely on a more developed constitutional jurisprudence to inform
undeveloped areas. Part IV briefly sketches what a new sensitive places test informed
by the nuisance exception might look like, and attempts to apply the test to a hypothetical case. Finally, Part V addresses some likely criticisms of the proposed test.
I. SENSITIVE PLACES “DOCTRINE”
This Part will briefly discuss how courts have decided sensitive places challenges.
It will show that, though outliers exist (e.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org33 and Class34), courts
in sensitive places cases generally follow a two-step decision framework employed
in other Second Amendment cases. This Part concludes that use of the two-part
framework has undermined the development of coherent sensitive places doctrine
and in some instances may run afoul of Heller’s emphasis on history and tradition.
The two-part framework currently employed by state and federal courts is the
approach most courts have adopted since Heller was decided.35 The structure—
typically referred to as the “two-part test” or “two-step test”—is based primarily on
First Amendment jurisprudence; it is the product of borrowing.36
At Step One of the framework the court engages in a coverage analysis: it seeks to
determine whether the regulated activity implicates the Second Amendment right.37 If
the court answers the question in the negative—the Second Amendment is not implicated—then the analysis ends.38 However, if the activity at issue does implicate the
Second Amendment, then the court proceeds to Step Two. At Step Two, the court engages in a protection analysis to determine whether the conduct regulated by the law
at issue is protected by the Second Amendment.39 Protection analysis typically involves
33

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).
Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018).
35
See Eric M. Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis
of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1451 (2018).
36
See generally infra Section III.A (discussing borrowing).
37
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 110.
38
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir 2010); see also BLOCHER &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 110.
39
See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; see also BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 110.
34
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the court applying some form of heightened scrutiny to the government’s justification
for the law at issue. Depending on the level of scrutiny applied, the relative strength
of the government’s reasoning for the law, and how tailored the law is to meet those
interests, the court will strike down or uphold the law.40
The way courts have implemented this framework is not uniform.41 On one end
of the spectrum are courts that more closely adhere to a more comprehensive
analysis at both Step One and Step Two. These courts will typically engage in some
form of historical inquiry at Step One to determine whether the conduct at issue was
traditionally considered part of the Second Amendment right. However, even with
these courts, the efforts lack a clear principle or coherent method of historical
analysis. This has led to inconsistent results that have frustrated litigants across the
ideological spectrum.
On the other side are courts that effectively skip Step One altogether by assuming without deciding that the conduct at issue is covered by the Second Amendment.
The courts’ reasoning here is even less rigorous and strays even further from a more
history- and tradition-focused approach. By avoiding the initial scope question, these
courts engage in little, if any, historical analysis. Instead, the bulk of the work is done
by a means-end scrutiny inquiry.42 In any event, none of the ways courts currently
implement the two-part test are conducive to consistent results or the development
of a real sensitive places doctrine. Some examples will help support this notion.
Consider the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Masciandaro—it represents the majority
approach to courts’ sensitive places analyses.43 Sean Masciandaro was arrested after a
Park Police officer found him asleep in the parking lot at a national park outside
Washington, D.C.44 Masciandaro was violating federal law, as he had a 9mm pistol in
40

See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95–97; see also BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 110.
The foregoing discussion is not exhaustive. For a more comprehensive treatment of the
two-part framework and the ways federal courts deploy it, see Kopel & Greenlee, supra note
11, at 212–26.
42
Fourth Circuit case law is particularly demonstrative of this particular analytical approach. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154,
159–68 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010). This analytical
approach is not unique to sensitive places cases—it is present in nearly all facets of Second
Amendment litigation. Stymieing the development of doctrine is one challenge this approach
presents; however, another is its impact on the court’s work at Step Two. In particular, skipping
Step One leaves little to no grist for the court to calibrate its scrutiny analysis at Step Two. For
an example of why this can be problematic see Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Attorney
Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 116–17, 128–29 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Bibas, J., dissenting). But
see Blocher, supra note 28, at 359–60 (arguing that the issues that occur when the Two Part
test is collapsed into one are not a feature of the test but a bug in Heller’s reliance on bright
line rules). The test proposed in this Article aims to provide a solution for this very problem.
43
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
44
Id. at 460.
41
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his car, inside the park.45 One question before the court was whether a national park is
a sensitive place.46 To frame his analysis for the court, Judge Wilkinson relied upon
the then-nascent two-step framework.47 However, the court skipped Step One and
couched its analysis in the Step Two inquiry. Rather than “resolv[ing] the ambiguity
in [Heller’s] sensitive places language,” and determining whether George Washington Parkway is a sensitive place, the court went straight to scrutiny analysis and
found the regulation passed “constitutional muster under the intermediate scrutiny
standard.”48 Most courts decide Second Amendment challenges in general and sensitive places cases in particular like the Masciandaro court.49
In United States v. Bonidy, the Tenth Circuit followed a similar approach.50 In
Bonidy, the question was whether a post office parking lot was a “government building” under Heller’s sensitive places exception.51 The court analyzed the question
two ways and answered the question in the affirmative under both. First, it looked
at the parking lot’s features as they related to the purpose and function of the post
office in general.52 It found that because the “postal transactions” occurring within
the building were also occurring in the parking lot via a drop-box, the parking lot and
building “should be considered as a single unit . . . Thus, the [sensitive places exception] in Heller applies with the same force to the parking lot as to the building itself.”53
The court reached this conclusion primarily by applying Tenth Circuit precedent.54
However, because the parking lot “present[ed] a closer question,” the court offered
an alternative basis for its holding.55 For its alternative analysis, the court attempted to
apply the two-part framework, but, like the Masciandaro court, it too collapsed the
steps into one. Rather than engaging in a more robust inquiry, and engaging with
45

Id.
Id.
47
Id. at 471–73 (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)). The
two-part framework or “two-step test” is generally attributed to Marzzarella. However, an empirical analysis of all Second Amendment litigation from Heller through February 1, 2016 found
a few decisions that applied it before Marzzarella. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 35, at 1490.
48
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473.
49
See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (observing that the two-part test had been largely adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016); Taylor
v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 F. Supp. 3d 807 (M.D. La. 2014); see also Ruben & Blocher,
supra note 35, at 1490–91 (finding empirical evidence that state and federal courts applied
tiered scrutiny in approximately half of all Second Amendment challenges in 2008 to 2016,
but discussing the challenges of actually identifying when a court is applying the framework
because some apply the test implicitly).
50
Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015).
51
Id. at 1125.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See id. (citing Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013)).
55
Id.
46
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history and tradition at Step One, the court concluded that it was “not necessary . . .
to make a definitive ruling on” whether the parking lot was sensitive because, “even
if . . . the parking lot is not itself considered part of a ‘government building’” the
challenged law is upheld under “intermediate scrutiny.”56
State courts follow a similar analysis in sensitive places cases. Consider People
v. Cunningham.57 In Cunningham, a question was whether state housing could restrict
firearm possession on its premises under the sensitive places exception, or whether
that was in tension with Heller’s holding.58 The Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the
regulation,59 and the Illinois Supreme Court denied review.60 In its analysis, the intermediate court jumped straight to Step Two.61 It avoided the threshold question of
whether the Second Amendment was implicated, and analyzed the regulation under
“heightened intermediate scrutiny.”62 The Cunningham Court noted that though the
law at issue imposed “some burden” on Second Amendment rights, because it was
not a complete ban on the right, a “more rigorous showing” was not needed.63
Some courts, however, have analyzed sensitive places questions in a manner that
arguably adheres more closely to a text, history, and tradition approach. One such
case, Ezell v. City of Chicago, dealt with a zoning ordinance that effectively barred
shooting ranges from most of Chicago.64 The city argued the policy fell into Heller’s
sensitive places exception.65
The Seventh Circuit stated that, though it was unsure how to “understand” Heller’s
sensitive places exception, the case did not require such comprehension.66 Instead
the court identified the two-part framework as the proper inquiry, where Step One
is a “textual and historical inquiry,” that requires the government to establish that
its regulation falls outside the scope of the right as it was originally understood.67
Step Two is implicated only “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or suggests
56

Id. at 1125–29.
126 N.E.3d 600 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
58
Id. at 606–07; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (observing that the Second
Amendment’s core right of self-defense is “most acute” in the home).
59
Cunningham, 126 N.E.3d at 615.
60
People v. Cunningham,132 N.E.3d 307 (Ill. 2019).
61
Cunningham, 126 N.E.3d at 609.
62
Id. at 615. The court found support for its analysis in a federal district court case, Doe
v. Wilmington Housing Authority, which it found was sufficiently analogous. 880 F. Supp.
2d 513 (D. Del. 2012), rev’d in part, 568 F. App’x 128 (3d Cir. 2014).
63
Cunningham, 126 N.E.3d at 615 (quoting People v. Chairez, 104 N.E.3d 1158, 1172
(Ill. 2018)); cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007–10 (1992) (finding a
violation of the Takings Clause because the challenged regulation eliminated all economic
value of the owner’s property).
64
(Ezell II), 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017).
65
Id. at 895.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 892; see also Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell I), 651 F.3d 684, 701–03 (7th Cir.
2011).
57
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that the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected,” in which case the analysis
turns to the government’s justification for its regulation.68
The court found the government was unable to point to sufficient historical
evidence that demonstrated that target practice was an unprotected act; the ordinance
thus failed at Step One.69 At Step Two, the court subjected the ordinance to a form
of heightened scrutiny.70 The court found the city’s rationale wanting; the public
health reasoning was, according to the court, unsupported by the evidence provided,
thus the regulation was held unconstitutional.71
Ezell was a court’s attempt to import Heller’s formalist features into the twopart framework. However, even the historical inquiry at Step One lacked rigor and
nuance. Thus, even a leading example of engaging with history and tradition in a
sensitive places analysis is relatively shallow.72
Further, some outlier cases barely follow the two-part framework. The reason
for the disuniformity is generally because the place at issue is more clearly a “school”
or “government building”: the only two locations specifically referenced in Heller as
sensitive. This line of analysis is problematic for two primary reasons. First, it ignores
Heller’s text, resulting in an erroneously underinclusive conception of sensitive places.
Justice Scalia made clear in Heller that sensitive places go beyond only “schools and
government buildings” when he qualified that phrase with “such as.”73 To the extent
courts are developing doctrine by reading Heller narrowly, coupled with a lukewarm
engagement with history and tradition, that doctrine is likely in tension with Heller.
Consider United States v. Dorosan, the first sensitive places case after Heller
was decided.74 Clarence Dorosan, a postal worker, carried a pistol in his mailbag and
car onto post office property—illegal under federal law.75 The question for the Fifth
68

Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703; see also Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 892.
Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 895–96.
70
Id. at 893.
71
Id. at 896.
72
Many scholars and commentators have observed that Heller provided little in the way
of guidance for subsequent Second Amendment cases, besides looking to history and tradition. Unsurprisingly, the efforts by judges have been, to say the least, inconsistent. See Jack
Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past: More Qualms About Public Meaning Originalism, 84FORDHAM
L. REV. 969, 971–76 (2015) (discussing the many issues that attend applying the original
public meaning method of constitutional interpretation with any rigor); see also ERIC J.
SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 143–47 (2018) (discussing some of the gaps in Heller’s
reasoning that create difficulties for lower courts); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second
Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case For Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
1187, 1197 (2015) (finding Heller’s prescribed method of originalist interpretation presents
lower courts with “serious difficulties” to implement in subsequent Second Amendment cases).
73
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
74
See generally United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
75
United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, 2009 WL 273300, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 2009),
aff’d, Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874.
69
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Circuit was whether the post office was a “government building” for Second Amendment purposes, and thus outside the Amendment’s scope.76
The court answered the question in the affirmative. Because the parking lot was
used for “regular government business,” the post office and the parking lot “fall[]
under the ‘sensitive places’ exception recognized by Heller.”77 The office and parking
lot fell so neatly into Heller’s exception as a “government building” that the court
did not need to analyze them under Step Two. Indeed, the court held the statute was
constitutional under “any applicable level of scrutiny.”78
The Virginia Supreme Court relied on similarly categorical reasoning in DiGiacinto
v. Rector and Visitors of George Mason University.79 In DiGiacinto, a visitor to
George Mason University challenged a regulation that prohibited anyone other than
a police officer from possessing or carrying a weapon on university property.80 The
state supreme court upheld the regulation as falling into the sensitive places exception, as the university is both a school and a government building.81 Though the
court made clear that its holding was based on the fact that George Mason is both
a school and a government building, it considered the fact that schools carry a
“reasonable expectation” that students will be free from “foreseeable harm.”82
Following a strict-reading approach like the preceding examples has a negative
corollary. It undermines the ability to develop sensitive places doctrine, which makes
it harder for judges to decide subsequent cases. Because this strict constructionist–type
test lacks a clear principle, it does not contribute to consistency in how federal
courts determine whether a place is sensitive under the Second Amendment. The
doctrines that govern sister rights were developed over decades as judges, scholars,
and practitioners worked through the principles and values that undergird their
substance—not by cutting corners.83 By resorting purely to scrutiny analysis, courts
significantly shorten the leash on their ability to develop doctrine for the Second
Amendment.84 This is troubling because, to the extent that the Second Amendment
has an existing theoretical foundation, it is “surprisingly thin” to begin with.85
76

Dorosan, 350 F. App'x at 875–76 (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27).
Id. (citing 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(l)).
78
Id. at 876.
79
704 S.E.2d 365 (Va. 2011).
80
Id. at 367.
81
Id. at 370.
82
Id. In reaching its holding, the court suggested that places where “people congregate
and are most vulnerable” is a characteristic material to a sensitive place analysis. Id.; see also
S.B. v. Seymour Cmty. Schs. 97 N.E.3d 288 (Ind. App. Ct. 2018) (finding no Second Amendment violation when school system prohibited plaintiff from bringing an AK-47 to school
because it would violate the expectation of peace and safety that inhere within school grounds).
83
Jacob D. Charles, Constructing a Constitutional Right, 99 N.C. L. REV (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 37).
84
See id. (manuscript at 38).
85
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 150.
77
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Finally, some courts have attempted to build upon the existing two-part framework by expanding sensitive places doctrine beyond scrutiny analysis. For example,
in GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, a gun rights organization brought a preenforcement challenge against a state regulation that criminalized carrying firearms
in particular locations.86 Specifically, they argued the state could not restrict weapons
in places of worship.87 The court’s analysis began with the “historical background
of the Second Amendment,” which looked first at the relationship between private
property rights and the right to keep and bear arms.88
The court discussed the extensive relationship between the Second Amendment
right and property rights at common law.89 It observed that “property law, tort law,
and criminal law provide the canvas on which our Founding Fathers drafted the
Second Amendment.”90 Further, the court found that the “Founding Fathers placed
the right to private property upon the highest of pedestals, standing side by side with
the right to personal security that underscores the Second Amendment”—one right
does not “abrogate” the other.91 Thus, the court concluded, it was entirely consistent
with the Second Amendment to permit a place of worship to forbid firearms on its
property, based on the fundamental property right at common law.92
In another Eleventh Circuit case initiated by GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc, the gun
rights group challenged a federal statute that proscribed certain weapons from being
carried loaded on Army Corps of Engineers property.93 The organization’s arguments were dismissed as unpersuasive, but the Eleventh Circuit briefly hinted at
what its sensitive places analysis might have looked like.94 Specifically, the court
enumerated several characteristics of the area—the Altoona Dam—signaling that such
facts weigh in a sensitive place analysis, in addition to history and tradition.95 It
86

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 2012). The
regulation proscribed the carrying of “weapons or long guns” in certain places absent a small
number of exceptions. The list of locations included government buildings; courthouses; jails
or prisons; places of worship; state mental health facilities; bars; nuclear power facilities; or
areas within “150 feet of any polling place.” Id. at 1248 n.3 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127).
87
Id. at 1248–49. However, it left an exception to the owners of the eight specified locations to permit the carriage of weapons on their premises in accord with their own specific
safety protocols. The statute further made it a misdemeanor should any permit holders who
were permitted to carry in a specific place fail to follow the location’s specific safety procedures. Id. at 1249.
88
Id. at 1261–63.
89
See id. at 1261–63.
90
Id. at 1263.
91
Id. at 1264–65.
92
Id.; see also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS
TO U.S.LAW:PROPERTY 4–5 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010) (discussing the fundamental property
right at common law).
93
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2015).
94
Id. at 1328.
95
The specific features the court wished to consider in its analysis included “the size of
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mentioned, among other factors, the dam’s size and the recreational area it adjoins,
as well as the dam’s national security implications.96 This discussion, albeit brief, suggests that physical and communal characteristics have a role in the analysis as to
whether a place is sensitive for a Second Amendment challenge. However, the court
never fully fleshed out these characteristics, nor did it apply them as a framework.
The Eleventh Circuit’s brief discussion was cited favorably by the D.C. Circuit
in United States v. Class.97 In Class, the defendant was arrested for possessing three
firearms on his person and in his car within 1,000 feet of the Rayburn House
Building on Capitol Grounds.98 The court upheld the challenged regulations as
constitutional at Step One.99 The parking lot where Class parked is sufficiently
“integrated” with the Capitol buildings that surround it to constitute a sensitive
place.100 Central to its analysis, the court looked at the types of individuals who
frequent the area, the proximity to the national legislature, and potential national
security implications.101
Some courts—such as those deciding GeorgiaCarry.Org. Inc. v. Army Corps. of
Engineers or Class—have been more willing to try and define the exception’s contours before falling back on a straight scrutiny analysis.102 Few courts—save,
perhaps, those deciding Ezell and GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia—employed
anything close to the historical analysis that Heller seemingly prescribes.103 Indeed,
the fact remains that the two-step framework is preferred by most courts over the
“originalist” method Heller and McDonald discussed. And understandably so: Second
Amendment litigation is voluminous,104 yet Heller provided lower court judges no
the Allatoona Dam, . . . a potential national security concern,” as well as “the size of the
recreational area at issue,” Id. In particular the court wanted to know “how far the recreational area extend[ed] beyond the dam, whether the recreational area is separated from the
dam itself by a fence or perimeter, or to what extent the dam is policed,” as well as the
amount of traffic the location received. Id.
96
Id.
97
See 930 F.3d. 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
98
Id. at 462.
99
Id. at 464.
100
Id. (“[T]he lot is close to the Capitol and legislative office buildings. Class possessed
a firearm less than 1,000 feet away from the entrance to the Capitol, and a block away from
the Rayburn House Office Building.”).
101
Id.
102
Id.; GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir.
2015).
103
For an argument as to why Ezell’s historical analysis is the “recommended” methodology,
see Nelson Lund, Promise and Perils in the Nascent Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment,
14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 207, 220–21 (2016). For an argument rejecting that notion, see
Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus
Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 36 (2012).
104
See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 35, at 1486.
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instructions on how to apply any kind of a “text, history, and tradition” method that
some say it requires.105 Absent clarification from the Court, it makes sense that lower
court judges would turn to a methodology that is more familiar.
But the way lower courts have been applying the two-part framework is not
doctrine. Rather, the test is “scaffolding,”106 or a “decision-making structure.”107 The
cases briefly discussed in this Part show that judges are still seeking the tools that
comprise the two-part structure to assist their sensitive places analyses in Second
Amendment litigation. In particular, lower courts are unfamiliar with how to implement a history- and tradition-based test at Step One. As the cases discussed
further show, courts have either attempted minimal engagement with history and
tradition, adhered strictly to Heller’s “schools and government buildings” language,
or jumped straight to the scrutiny analysis at Step Two.108 This inconsistency is due
primarily to the fact that no test currently exists that judges can readily implement.
Indeed, the cases show that there is not yet a unifying analytical method that has
drawn a consensus, beyond applying the decision structure itself. Moreover, though
lower court judges have indicated they are “await[ing]” further guidance from the
Court, implementing the two-part framework indicates judges look more favorably
upon analytical tools they are familiar with, and preferably ones that have a body of
case law associated with them.109
Fortunately, there is existing doctrine that is both familiar and carries a rich body
of case law that could assist judges with sensitive places analyses.110 Indeed, though
Heller’s sensitive places are an underdeveloped category within an already “embryonic” area of constitutional law, location-based exceptions to a constitutional right are
not unique.111 To be sure, the Second Amendment is not the only individual, fundamental constitutional right that pre-figures the founding, that is subject to such an exception.
A discussion of the nuisance exemption to the Takings Clause is instructive.
105

See, e.g., Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2018) (Elrod, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc) (advocating for a text, history, and tradition approach);
Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012), withdrawn and
superseded on reh’g by 682 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting) (“As several of
our sister circuits have recognized, Heller and McDonald dictate that the scope of the Second
Amendment be defined solely by reference to its text, history, and tradition.”) (emphasis
added); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1280–82 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (advocating for the text, history, and tradition approach).
106
Charles, supra note 83, at 1.
107
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 117.
108
See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell II), 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017); Bonidy v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015).
109
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
110
See infra Part II (discussing the nuisance exception to the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment).
111
Morgan, supra note 30, at 199.
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II. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND ITS NUISANCE EXCEPTION
The founders viewed the right to property to be a fundamental, individual right.112
They protected this right by providing the means to challenge government action that
unlawfully prevents continued use of property, renders it unusable, or expropriates
it.113 The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”114 The provision was written
to govern the balance between individual liberty and the community’s wants and
needs.115 It demonstrates a truism in constitutional law that no right is absolute.116
112

See Jud Campbell, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 97 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT,
REPUBLICANISM AND NATURAL RIGHTS AT THE FOUNDING OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION:
SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016)); see also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129 (discussing the property right as a fundamental right).
113
See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Original Understanding of “Property” in the Constitution,
100 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2016).
114
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115
Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 735, 745
(1985); cf. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“[The Second Amendment] is the very product
of an interest balancing by the people[.]”).
116
Since before Ratification, American courts recognized that even fundamental, individual
rights are secondary to public welfare. For a good example, see Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (Pa. 1788) (finding no violation and no compensation needed when the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania took 227 barrels of flour from the plaintiff to prevent the goods
from potentially falling into the hands of the British army, thus assisting in their attempted
capture of Philadelphia). Though necessity was doing most of the work in Sparhawk, it was
being exercised via Pennsylvania’s sovereign police power. Justice Shaw of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts explored the distinction between permissible regulation via
the police power and a violation of one’s property right. In Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, for
example, Shaw found the line between regulation and condemnation to be fuzzy:
It is extremely difficult to lay down any general rule, or draw a precise
line between the cases where the restraint of the right of the owner is
such that compensation ought to be provided, and where the regulation
is such only as to prevent a particular use of the property from being a
public nuisance.
52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 58–59 (1846). In upholding the law, Justice Shaw recognized the “high
power” legislatures have over the “the right of private property” when the exercise of the
right is injurious to the public. Id. at 56–58. In Commonwealth v. Alger, the plaintiff violated
the law when he built a wharf in a particular part of Boston harbor statutorily foreclosed from
construction. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). Upholding the law, Justice Shaw wrote:
We think it is a settled principle . . . [that r]ights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as
the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in
them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
Id. at 84–85. In doing so, Justice Shaw clarified that regulating property rights was not a per
se taking, but rather a rightful power of the legislature to limit risks to the public stemming
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This principle is well recognized and reflected in the state’s police power to regulate
nuisances created by an individual’s use of their property.117
In a line of cases, beginning in the late nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme
Court formalized the states’ ability to regulate an individual’s use of their property
without constituting a taking under the nuisance exception. The exception would
expand until Justice Scalia narrowed it in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
in 1992.118
The first case to recognize the nuisance exception was Mugler v. Kansas.119 In
Mugler, state law effectively banned the manufacture and sale of liquor as a nuisance to the community.120 The law rendered the plaintiff’s distillery worthless. The
Court found no taking, however, as it recognized the police power as a remedial
power for the state to protect public health from what the state deems a nuisance.121
Thus, the state’s prohibition on the production and sale of alcohol did not violate the
Constitution.122 The Court’s reasoning essentially rested not only on the axiom that
the property right is not absolute, but on the principle that “no man should use his
property to injure that of his neighbor.”123
The next important case expounding on the nuisance exception was Hadacheck
v. Sebastian,124 where, unlike Mugler, it was the location of the nuisance that drove the
Court to find an exception to the property right. The City of Los Angeles made it unlawful to operate a brickyard within its limits due to the smoke produced by kilns.125
The California Supreme Court upheld the city’s ordinance, resting its conclusion on
two important bases. First, the city’s ordinance carried a “presumption[] in favor of”
from an individual exercising their constitutional right. Indeed, a well-recognized principle
at common law preached that “no man should use his property so as to injure that of his
neighbor.” Scott M. Reznick, Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings
in Nineteenth Century America, 40 U.CHI. L. REV. 854, 862 (1973).
117
See, e.g., Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) at 56–58.
118
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
119
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 688–69.
122
In particular, the Court observed that:
A prohibition . . . [on] the use of property for purposes that are declared,
by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health . . . or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an
appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does
not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful
purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration
by the state that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is
prejudicial to the public interests.
Id.
123
See Reznick, supra note 116, at 862.
124
239 U.S. 394 (1915).
125
Id. at 404.
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its lawfulness.126 Second, the inconvenience to residents in the area outweighed the
city’s infringement on the petitioner’s private individual right.127 The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed this reasoning and added an additional dimension.128 Justice Rutledge,
writing for a unanimous Court, observed that the city was not foreclosing the petitioners from brickmaking—i.e., they were not banned.129 Rather, the decision below was
affirmed because the ordinance was location-based; it prohibited brickmaking only
“within the designated locality.”130 In doing so, the Court expanded the nuisance exception doctrine beyond just per se nuisances, to include location-based nuisances, as well.
The nuisance exception expanded beyond a fixed conception of nuisance in
Miller v. Schoene.131 In Miller, Virginia’s apple orchards were dying due to a rare
plant disease carried by red cedars.132 The state quickly enacted the Cedar Rust Act,
which declared trees carrying the disease within a certain distance of apple orchards
a nuisance.133 Anyone who “own[ed], plant[ed] or ke[pt] alive and standing” any red
cedars, within the specified locations violated the Act.134 The Court upheld the state
statute. In doing so, it noted that it did not need to “weigh with nicety the question
whether the infected cedars constitute[d] a nuisance according to the common law;
or whether they may be so declared by statute.”135
This expansion of nuisance, from a static, common law–like basis, to a more
deferential standard was repeated in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.136 In Goldblatt,
the town passed an ordinance that prohibited the petitioner from continuing its
mining practice, after it crossed a specified depth beyond the water table.137 Petitioner
argued that its individual right to use its land for profit was removed completely—it
was effectively banned from exercising its property right.138 The town argued the regulation was constitutional, as it was using its police power to prevent children from
drowning in artificial lakes—like the one at issue—as well as to protect against possible
pollution of the local water supply.139 The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument.140
It noted that it is not “of controlling significance that [gravel mining] . . . is arguably
126

Id. at 409.
Id.
128
See id. at 412.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 408–11.
131
276 U.S. 272 (1928).
132
Id. at 277.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 280 (citing Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915)).
136
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
137
Id. at 592.
138
Id.
139
See Brief of Appellee, at 20, Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
(No. 78), 1961 WL 101618.
140
Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591.
127
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not a common law nuisance”141 and that so long as the regulation at issue is intended
to preserve “the health, the morals, or the safety of the public,”142 it is presumed
valid.143 Thus, if the state can produce facts supporting that presumption, the court’s
inquiry ends.144
Whatever flexibility Miller and Goldblatt introduced to the nuisance exception,
the doctrine was narrowed approximately three decades later in Lucas.145
A. Lucas’s History and Tradition Test
In 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that when a state enacts legislation that
strips all economically beneficial use from a piece of property the Constitution is
violated.146 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that if a piece of property’s
only value is a use that is proscribed by a statute, then that statute is “categorically”
unconstitutional, as it effectively bans an individual’s property right.147 However,
141

Id. at 593.
Id.
143
Id. at 594.
144
Id.
145
Lucas presented the Court with the optimal vehicle to move its takings jurisprudence
away from the balancing tests prescribed by its earlier regulatory takings cases, Penn Central
and Mahon. The factual record from the South Carolina trial court purportedly showed a total
diminution in value of Lucas’s beachfront land. This allowed the Court to create the additional taking category and further narrow the nuisance exception back to those that existed
at common law. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 n.9 (1992) (avoiding
having to determine whether all economic value of Lucas’ land was indeed eliminated by
merely accepting as true the factual findings of the state trial court). However, a number of
the justices questioned the factual findings in the Lucas record. See id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (finding the record “curious” and expressing “reservations” about the majority’s
acceptance of it); id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding the record “implausible” and
“almost certainly” erroneous); id. at 1076 (statement of Souter, J.) (observing that the record
was “highly questionable” and stating that certiorari was “improvidently” granted). Similarly,
some scholars suggest that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller necessitated the peculiar law
at issue to sustain it. See, e.g., ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT
TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 89–92, 175–78 (2d ed. 2013) (describing how the severity of
D.C.'s law plus the NRA's engineering were essential for the outcome in Heller); Cass R.
Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 263
(2008) (“At the same time, the law at issue in Heller was among the most draconian in the
nation—a genuine national outlier.”); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
629 (2008) (“Few laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction
of the District’s handgun ban.”).
146
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031–32.
147
Id. at 1027. This new categorical rule represented an addition to existing per se takings,
which render the statute at issue unconstitutional, regardless of the public interests it protects.
The Takings Clause also renders per se unconstitutional regulations that require the property
“owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property.” Id. at 1015 (discussing Loretto v.
142

2020]

SECOND AMENDMENT BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES

179

the new rule in Lucas was subject to an exception, based on the principles that
animated Mugler and its progeny.
Justice Scalia would similarly structure his reinterpretation of a constitutional
right nearly two decades later writing for the majority in Heller. In both cases, the
Court, speaking through Scalia, conceived of a fundamental, natural right in brightline, absolute terms.148 However, in both instances it concludes that the right is not
absolute, and identifies location-based exceptions to both.149 Similarly, both courts
observed that the proper analysis for property rights and the right to bear arms looks
to history and tradition.150 But like the underlying rights themselves, the historical
analysis is similarly not an absolute—contemporary considerations can play a role
in how courts analyze both. This Section will briefly examine how the Court’s wellestablished takings doctrine was narrowed to a more formalistic history- and
tradition-based test, yet still left open consideration of contemporary factors, such
as modern technology.
In Lucas, the petitioner challenged a statute enacted to protect the coastal land
of the state’s beaches.151 David Lucas purchased two oceanfront lots that he hoped
to build homes on.152 However, before he could begin construction the state passed
the Beachfront Management Act to control erosion that had decimated the coastline.153
The Act created a setback line, which prohibited any new construction within a
specified zone on the beach. Lucas’s lots were within the zone.154
Lucas challenged the law as a regulatory taking, under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.155 In short, Lucas argued that, though the legislature lawfully passed
the Act under its police power, the construction ban unconstitutionally deprived him
of all economic use of his property.156 In the opinion’s syllabus, the Court summarized his claim: “[E]ven though the Act may have been a lawful exercise of the
State’s police power, the ban on construction deprived him of ‘all economically
viable use’ of his property.”157 The Court’s five-member majority accepted that argument. It held that a regulation that strips property of all economically beneficial
use constitutes a taking and, thus, requires compensation, unless the use of the property
violates “restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)); see also Horne v. Dep’t. of
Agric., 576 U.S. 350 (2015).
148
See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 625–26; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28.
149
See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
150
See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 625–27; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
151
505 U.S. at 1009, 1021–22, n.10.
152
Id. at 1006–07.
153
Id. at 1007–08.
154
Id. at 1008–09.
155
Id. at 1007.
156
Id. at 1009, 1020.
157
Id. at 1003.
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nuisance already place upon land ownership.”158 Such uses fall outside the scope of
an individual’s property rights and, thus, garner no protection.159
Lucas’s holding had several unique doctrinal and analytical features. First, it
narrowed the nuisance exception’s scope by cutting the noxious-use conception—the
capacious theories of nuisance that animated Mugler and Miller160—as a defense to
a takings challenge.161 Second, Justice Scalia suggested courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to guide their nuisance inquiry.162 Specifically, he suggested
courts’ analyses focus on
[T]he degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent
private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, . .
. the social value of the claimant’s activities and their suitability
to the locality in question, . . . and the relative ease with which
the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners)
alike . . . .163
Third, the conception of nuisance that Justice Scalia invoked is a historical one.
Lucas requires a government defendant support its nuisance defense by showing that
the regulation at issue is of the kind that would have supported a nuisance action at
158

Id. at 1029. This inquiry into a state’s “background principles” is “antecedent” to the
takings analysis—i.e., it is a threshold question for a court. Id. at 1027. In any “total takings”
challenge—whether it is a complete diminution case or a physical invasion challenge—the
court begins by asking the Lucas background principles question: Does the owner’s property
right recognize this particular use or piece of property? Thus, courts begin a takings analysis
with a scope question. Cf. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Our
threshold inquiry, then, is whether [the regulation at issue] regulates conduct that falls within
the scope of the Second Amendment.”).
159
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (“[The state] may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with.”).
160
See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
161
In doing so, cases like Mugler and Miller were implicitly overruled. See Todd D.
Brody, Comment, Examining the Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause: Is There Life
for Environmental Regulations After Lucas, 4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 287, 302 (1993)
(“The second and more controversial feature of the holding is that it overrules Miller and the
other cases where the legislature had declared that certain uses of property were nuisances.”).
162
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31.
163
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 826, 827, 828(a), (b), (c), 830 and 831).
The Restatement framework would serve as guideposts, whereas the bite of the inquiry must
come from an “objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents,” as opposed to
requiring a judge to find common law precedent that is directly on point. Id. at 1032 n.18.
Lucas’s mode of analysis allows “some leeway in a court's interpretation of what existing
state law permits.” Id.
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common law.164 However, this historical formulation is not absolute. Scalia observed
that traditional concerns, like public health and safety, may justify new regulations.165 To illustrate his point, Scalia provided an example where a private nuclear
power plant is compelled to close because it is built upon an earthquake fault.166
Such a use, though contemporary, was always outside the scope of the owner’s Fifth
Amendment rights, and thus unlawful because of where the right was being exercised.167 That the technology or particular use was modern is not material to the
analysis. Rather, the proper inquiry looks to see whether the use at issue implicates
traditional concerns, like public safety.168
B. The History and Tradition Test Post-Lucas
In Lucas, Justice Scalia implied the nuisance exception’s background principles
are restricted to a state’s tradition of judge-made law. The case’s other opinions
indicate as much.169 Notably, Justice Kennedy observed in his concurrence that
“[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory
power in a complex and interdependent society. The State should not be prevented from
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts
must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source.”170 Since Lucas was
decided in 1992, however, many state courts have relied upon Justice Kennedy’s
conception of the Lucas rule, and have permitted statutes to serve, in addition to
common law precedent, as background principles guiding their takings analyses.171
But Justice Kennedy narrowed this conception about a decade later in Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island.172 Writing for the majority, he held that a takings claim “is not
164

Id. at 1029.
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 1030.
168
Id.
169
See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (critiquing the majority’s new rule as framing
property rights based upon the “common law of nuisance”); id. at 1046–47 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing the majority as creating a new “categorical rule” subject only to
the “common-law” of nuisance or “property principles”); id. at 1068–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court’s nuisance exception test as looking at a “[frozen]” body
of “the State’s common law”).
170
Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
171
See Robert L. Glicksman, Making A Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y
149, 169–82 (2000) (discussing K&K Constr. Inc., J.F.K. v. Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 551 N.W.2d
413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); City of Va. Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998); Kim v.
City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997); Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678
N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1997); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388 (S.C. 1995); Scott
v. City of Del Mar, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 317 (Ct. App. 1997)).
172
533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001).
165
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barred by the mere fact that the . . . title was acquired after the effective date of the
state-imposed restriction.”173 This was a response to what was effectively a race to
pass statutes proscribing various uses before owners could purchase property for the
purpose of a given use.174
Palazzolo did not completely eliminate statutes as a source of background
principles, though. Justice Kennedy observed that “[t]he right to improve property,
of course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority, including the
enforcement of valid zoning and land-use restrictions.”175 In fact, in a subsequent
takings case, other justices confirmed this notion: a state’s historical background
principles come not just from common law but also statutes.176 Though Kennedy
failed to provide a specific rule for when a state statute or regulation can be considered a background principle, he noted that the determination “must turn on objective
factors, such as the nature of the land use proscribed.”177
Lower courts generally follow the Palazzolo rule that statutes and regulations
are a permissible source of background principles. They will look at the regulation
to determine whether the particular use at issue was historically within a property
owner’s property right, or whether the state historically or traditionally regulated it.178
173

Id.
The “notice rule” reasoned that when a buyer purchased property for a given use, a
takings challenge was foreclosed so long as the prohibition on the particular use was on the
books before the purchase, as the buyer would be on notice as to the lawfulness of the use.
See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property
in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. Rep. 175, 176 n.4 (2004).
Some argued this incentivized a race for developers to quickly purchase land before the
intended use was foreclosed. See J. David Breemer & R.S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky
Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo, and the Lower Courts’ Disturbing
Insistence on Wallowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 351, 359–60 (2005);
cf. Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of Columbia v. Heller, 111
W.VA. L. REV. 349, 384–85 (2009) (discussing how Heller’s “common use” test incentivizes
a race between legislatures and gun owners to regulate a particular weapon class before it
becomes too popular and thus in “common use”).
175
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
176
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 352
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
177
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
178
Among other things, Palazzolo teaches that federal statutes can be the source of background principles. See, e.g., Reeves v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 652 (2002); Am. Pelagic
Fishing Co. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (2001). In Reeves, the Court of Federal Claims held
that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 was a “background principle,”
thus disposing of the plaintiff’s takings claim at the threshold question of whether the owner’s
property right was in fact implicated. Reeves, 54 Fed. Cl. at 672–73. The court held that as
a matter of tradition, the federal government always had “broad powers over the terms and
conditions upon which the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired.” Id. at 672. Similarly, in American Pelagic, the Court of Federal Claims held that a conservation statute was
174
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In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Tahoe-Sierra, where he indicated
that at least some “valid zoning and land-use” regulations may serve as a source of
background principles for Lucas’s nuisance exception, rested his reasoning on the
fact that such regulations are “longstanding.”179 A court will determine whether the
particular use was traditionally part of an owner’s property right, or whether the
regulation at issue reflects a “traditional sovereign regulation” of property rights.180
Thus, even with Justice Kennedy’s gloss on the Lucas rule, history and tradition play
a central role in a takings analysis.181 However, since Lucas was decided, reliance
on history and tradition has manifested as a threshold inquiry.
Lucas prescribes the historical examination as the “logically antecedent inquiry,” meaning the analysis begins with history and tradition—the inquiry occurs
at Step One.182 A court will look to the relevant state’s history to determine whether
the particular use was traditionally deemed a nuisance. The court may look to judgemade or statutory law in its examination.183 Whatever the source, judges have “some
leeway” to interpret the state’s history and tradition; however, it must be “objectively reasonable.”184 At Step One the court must determine whether the particular
use is outside the owner’s rights. If so, then the regulation is upheld. But if the use
is within the owner’s rights then the analysis proceeds to a multifactor test that is
effectively identical to Step Two of the two-part test currently used in Second
Amendment analyses.
a “background principle” under Lucas, thus disposing of the plaintiff’s takings claim. Am.
Pelagic, 49 Fed. Cl. at 1379. Specifically, it held that the statute was “consistent with the
historical role played by the sovereign, state or federal, with respect to its waters.” Id.
179
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Rehnquist
explicitly mentioned the fact that “New York City enacted the first comprehensive zoning
ordinance in 1916.” Id. Some scholars have noted that this represents a line drawing exercise
such that regulations of the kind passed prior to 1916 are “insulated” from a takings
challenge under the Lucas framework. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29
HARV.ENVTL.L.REV. 321, 358 (2005). However, the history of environmental and conservation
law indicates that statutes enacted after 1916 would survive as well, due to their historical
lineage. See id. Similar issues attend Second Amendment analyses. See BLOCHER & MILLER,
supra note 17, at 129–30 (discussing the many analytic “difficulties” that attend conferring
history a “privileged” position).
180
Reeves, 54 Fed. Cl. at 671–72; see also Glenn P. Sugameli, Threshold Statutory and
Common Law Background Principles of Property and Nuisance Law Define if There is a
Protected Property Interest, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PERSPECTIVES § 7.2 (2002).
181
See, e.g., Reeves, 54 Fed. Cl. at 671–72.
182
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
183
See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text; see also Rith Energy, Inc. v. United
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 115 (1999) (relying on state water quality statutes to assess the scope
of plaintiff’s property right), aff’d on other grounds, 247 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
184
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18.
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The Court’s nuisance exception test provides a method for courts to determine
whether a fundamental, individual right can be subject to exception based on where
an individual exercises that right.185 The framework relies upon history and tradition
and limits balancing. It defines the scope of a right that is central to the republic; a
right that often incites as much fervor in discussions inside and outside the courtroom as the right to keep and bear arms. One important question, though, is why we
should look to the Fifth Amendment to inform our thinking of the Second. The next
Part will take up that very question.
III. WHY COURTS SHOULD BORROW FROM THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Borrowing occurs when a court imports methodological or substantive features
from one part of the Constitution to help develop jurisprudence in another. It is a
well-trodden doctrinal path for the Court. However, this Part will seek to show why
the Fifth Amendment’s takings doctrine is a particularly ideal source to draw from
for the Second Amendment’s emerging sensitive places jurisprudence.
A. Why Borrow?
Professors Tebbe and Tsai have chronicled how judges and scholars rely on borrowing as a way to solve complex questions of constitutional law when doctrine is
undeveloped, unworkable, or there is a dearth of precedent to draw from.186 For
instance, Justice Scalia borrowed from several other Amendments in Heller.187
Indeed, his reliance on the First Amendment informed the two-part framework.188
In the context of the Second Amendment, one scholar has commented that reliance
on borrowing is “pervasive and wide-ranging.”189
185

See discussion supra Section II.B.
Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
463 (2010) (“A person engages in borrowing when . . . that person draws on one domain of
constitutional knowledge in order to interpret, bolster, or otherwise illuminate another
domain.”); see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 259 (2d Cir.
2015) (“Though we have historically expressed ‘hesitan[ce] to import substantive First Amendment principles wholesale into Second Amendment jurisprudence,’ we readily ‘consult
principles from other areas of constitutional law, including the First Amendment’ in deciding
whether a law ‘substantially burdens Second Amendment rights.’”) (quoting United States
v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2012)).
187
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80 n.6, 582, 591–92, 595, 635
(2008) (relying on the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments); see also Armed in America,
supra note 21, at 28:30–29:43 (discussing the Court’s use of borrowing).
188
See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 n.15 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
First Amendment is a useful tool in interpreting the Second Amendment.”).
189
Charles, supra note 83, at 21.
186
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Borrowing helps legitimize the underdeveloped doctrine and promotes the rule
of law.190 This support is especially essential for a right that too often is “misunderstood, misrepresented, or wielded as a rhetorical weapon.”191 Though takings law is,
like all constitutional law, shifting and evolving, the Court’s takings doctrine has
eliminated much of the guesswork for lower courts.192 Judges have an established,
familiar set of doctrinal tools at their disposal. In that way, importing takings doctrine
to assist lower courts with Second Amendment analysis would similarly reduce ambiguity and increase the legitimacy of the doctrine.
As with borrowing generally, looking to common law jurisprudence in particular to inform doctrine governing a constitutional right is similarly established.193 For
example, in addition to the Lucas court looking to nuisance law to frame an individual’s property right, the Court has looked to trespass doctrine to frame privacy rights194
and reputational torts to further define free speech rights.195 However, the Fifth Amendment’s takings doctrine is an optimal “fit” for the Second Amendment’s sensitive
places exception for two primary reasons.196 The next two Sections will address them.
B. Propertization
As previously discussed, looking to more established constitutional doctrine to
inform less-established doctrine is not new.197 When courts engage in borrowing,
they are arguably engaging in analogical reasoning at the doctrinal level.198Analogies
are typically deployed successfully only in instances where things have relevant
similarities without relevant differences.199 Thus, instances where a court borrows from
one area of its jurisprudence for another suggests the similarities present between
the two are doctrinally relevant, whereas any differences are not.200 The Supreme
Court has imported property-based elements into several constitutional rights—
including the right to keep and bear arms.201 Professor John Sprankling refers to the
190

Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 186, at 493.
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 175.
192
See Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
307, 371 (2007).
193
See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 713–19 (2011) (discussing three examples of “the
Court's continuing inclination . . . to incorporate the language and logic of constitutional tort
doctrine in formulating its approach” to constitutional doctrine).
194
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).
195
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272–73 (1964).
196
Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 186, at 495–99 (discussing fit in doctrinal borrowing).
197
See Charles, supra note 83, at 22.
198
See id. at 22–26.
199
See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV.L.REV. 741, 773–74 (1993).
200
See Laurin, supra note 193, at 722 (“Borrowing ‘works’ in the first instance only
where there is some plausible resonance or fit between the source and target doctrines.”).
201
Sprankling, supra note 28, at 6–7 (discussing other examples, such as Fourth Amendment rights.).
191
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substantive borrowing of property principles as “propertization.”202 This Section will
discuss the Court’s import of property principles to other constitutional rights and
the significance of those principles on sensitive places doctrine.
In Heller, the Court concluded that the Second Amendment protects the use of
a handgun for lawful self-defense in the home.203 In reaching its holding, the Court
introduced property-based principles into the novel constitutional right by framing
it in a particular place—the home.204 This move—baking property principles into a
constitutional right—is something it has repeated since deciding Heller. In a landmark Fourth Amendment case, Justice Scalia, again writing for the Court, introduced property-based principles into the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
“unreasonable searches.”205
In United States v. Jones, the Court was asked to determine whether the government violated the Fourth Amendment when it secured evidence supporting an
indictment via a G.P.S. tracking device it attached to a defendant’s car.206 The Court
answered in the affirmative. Its analysis began by observing that courts before the
founding emphasized “the significance of property rights in search-and-seizure analysis,” and that the Fourth Amendment right has a “close connection to property.”207
Specifically, the Court’s constitutional analysis turned not so much on what the
government did, but where it did it.208 That is, the Court’s reasoning was largely
location-based and was framed by property principles.209 By attaching the tracking
device to the defendant’s car, the Court held, the government officers “encroached
on a protected area,” thus, violating Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights.210 As Scalia
observed, for the purposes of constitutional protection, where a right is being asserted
makes all the difference.211 The Court’s holding in Jones suggests that when the
Court frames a constitutional right as being subject to a location-based analysis, that
right is animated by at least some property-based principles similar to those that
undergird property doctrines like trespass.
202

Sprankling, supra note 28, at 6.
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
204
Id. at 628–29.
205
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (quoting U.S. Const. amend IV).
206
Id. at 402.
207
Id. at 405 (discussing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)).
208
See id. at 405–07.
209
See id.
210
Id. at 410. Importantly, Scalia noted that Jones was entitled to the property rights of
an owner (or bailee). See id. at 404 n.2.
211
See id. at 404–06. Scalia noted further that the Court’s holding in Jones reinvigorate
the Court’s “property-based” Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This assertion was made
even more clear by Scalia’s reliance on old English property cases as he framed the scope
of the Fourth Amendment right. See id. at 405 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(C.P. 1765)); see also id. at 426–27 (Alito, J., concurring) (questioning whether Scalia was
applying the law of trespass).
203
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Justice Scalia’s borrowing in Jones was not abnormal. One year later, again writing
for the Court, Scalia expounded upon the Court’s reasoning in Jones and the propertybased principles in the Fourth Amendment in Florida v. Jardines.212 Jardines asked
“whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents
of the home is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”213 Scalia
answered in the affirmative; in so doing he affirmed that “the traditional propertybased understanding of the Fourth Amendment” is still the law.214
As in Jones, the Court in Jardines held that a constitutional right was subject to
location-based analysis—whether the challenged conduct occurred within a “constitutionally protected” or unprotected area.215 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment right extends beyond the home, to the area “immediately surrounding” it, where
the right to privacy is “most heightened.”216 Because the government conducted its
search within the constitutionally protected area, it violated the defendant’s rights.217
Thus, as Justice Scalia stated in Jones, where a right is being asserted makes all the
difference as to whether it is protected.218
The propertized holdings in Jones and Jardines echo Justice Scalia’s interpretation
in Heller. There, Scalia held that the government had impermissibly infringed upon
Dick Heller’s Second Amendment right by regulating the possession and use of handguns within the home.219 Indeed, in striking down D.C.’s laws, Scalia expressly observed that the Second Amendment right is “most acute” not when it is exercised by a
particular person or in a certain manner, but in a certain place.220 Through Justice
Scalia, the Court has shown that at least some constitutional rights—especially when
their analyses turn on location-based rules or exceptions—are animated by property
law principles.221
212

569 U.S. 1 (2013).
Id. at 3.
214
Id. at 11.
215
Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
216
Id. at 6–7; cf. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (observing that the “need for defense
of self, family, and property is most acute” in the home). Further, in holding the curtilage of
Jardines’s house to be a protected area, Scalia relied on Blackstone’s location-based analysis
of what constitutes burglary. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *223, *225).
217
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7.
218
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410 (2012).
219
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
220
Id. at 628.
221
See Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the ThirdParty Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 258–59 (2016) (describing the Court’s
property-based Fourth Amendment doctrine as being largely based on where the right is being
asserted); see also Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 572–74
213
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But in Heller Justice Scalia went further than he did in Jones or Jardines to
propertize a constitutional right. In addition to its location-based framing, Heller was
solely focused on firearms.222 This curious elevation of a particular chattel worked
to propertize the Second Amendment by “thingifying” the right to keep and bear
arms.223 The move further introduced property-like principles into the Second Amendment right by framing its protection around a specific thing in a particular place.224
As with the Jones and Jardines duo, a year after Heller was decided the Court
further expounded upon the property-like principles in the Second Amendment in
McDonald v. City of Chicago.225 In McDonald, the question for the Court was whether
and how to incorporate the new Second Amendment right onto the states.226 Ultimately,
the Court chose to apply Heller’s interpretation to the states through the Due Process
Clause.227 Though the right was ultimately incorporated as a liberty interest, Justices in
both the majority and dissent signaled support for a property-based conception.228 In his
dissent, Justice Stevens observed that the right to keep and bear arms “may be better
viewed as a property right[,] [since] [i]nterests in the possession of chattels have
traditionally been viewed as property interests subject to definition and regulation by
the States.”229 Additionally, though Justice Scalia criticized Stevens’s argument in his
concurring opinion, he observed the Due Process Clause “explicitly protects property,”
and cited to a prior opinion where he argued that fundamental rights are best understood as property interests.230

(2017) (observing that a primary factor in deciding whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated
depends on where the right is being asserted).
222
See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 132 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing Heller’s preferential
treatment of handguns); MARY ANN FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 79–80 (2019).
223
See id. at 80; see also Kyle Hatt, Note, Gun-Shy Originalism: The Second Amendment’s
Original Purpose in District of Columbia v. Heller, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 505, 519 n.94
(2011) (“[A]s the Heller Court’s analysis implied, the Second Amendment protects just firearms.”); Joseph Blocher, The Second Amendment of Things (and Grievances), BALKINIZATION
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/10/the-second-amendment-of-thingsand
html [https://perma.cc/FB87-Y3AL] (reviewing FRANKS, supra note 222).
224
See Schwab & Sprankling, supra note 28, at 167; cf. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1,
7 (2013) (distinguishing existing Fourth Amendment doctrine focused on the nature of the
government’s actions to find a Fourth Amendment violation because the government intrusion
took place in a “constitutionally protected area”).
225
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
226
Id. at 750.
227
Id. at 791.
228
See Sprankling, supra note 28, at 9–10.
229
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 203, 219 and
accompanying text (discussing how Heller’s holding focused its constitutional protection on
firearms, especially handguns).
230
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 799–800 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing United States v.
Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994)).

2020]

SECOND AMENDMENT BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES

189

When discussing property principles, the question of what exactly is property
will inevitably arise.231 Indeed, the inquiry has long animated debates among judges
and scholars. In particular, the discussion is frequently centered around whether
property is a fixed or dynamic concept.232 The answer to that question often dictates
the elements and features of relevant doctrine.233 Thus, for a property-based conception
of Second Amendment doctrine, it is important to understand how, if at all, the Court
may conceive of the property principles that animate the right to keep and bear arms.
In Heller and McDonald, the plaintiffs were challenging laws that infringed on
the possession of handguns.234 In Heller, Justice Scalia read the Second Amendment’s
text as guaranteeing the right to “have weapons” and “possess[] arms.”235 Justice
Alito struck down a similar law in McDonald in recognition that states cannot ban
the possession of arms.236 Possession is a property interest; however neither Heller
nor McDonald expounded upon what conception of property the Second Amendment relies.237 The Court’s recent decision in United States v. Henderson, though, signaled how the Court might answer that question.238 Its unanimous decision indicates
the Court sees the propertized Second Amendment as being based upon a more fluid
conception of property—as it did with the Takings Clause in Lucas239—despite its
rhetoric implying fixed, static conceptions of rights and liberties.240
At issue in Henderson was whether a felony conviction precludes a court from
ordering a felon’s firearms be transferred to a third party to whom the felon has sold
their property interest.241 A unanimous court answered the question in the negative.242
Justice Kagan’s opinion focused on the distinction between ownership and possession,
noting that the federal law governing felon possession—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—
regulates only “a single incident of ownership, one of the proverbial sticks in the bundle
of property rights, by preventing the felon from knowingly possessing his . . . guns.”243
231

See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 92, at 2.
Blocher, supra note 223 (quoting Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012)).
233
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 92, at 2.
234
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742; Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008).
235
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 582–83.
236
See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780–87, 791.
237
See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 92, at 121 (“Possession is more than a method of
original acquisition. Possession is arguably the most basic property institution.”).
238
135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015).
239
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–32 (1992).
240
See Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247,
260–63 (2007) (discussing Scalia’s conception of property in Lucas).
241
Henderson, 135 S. Ct. at 1783.
242
Id. at 1783, 1787.
243
Id. at 1784. Perhaps subsequent research could further examine the Court’s discussion
in Henderson and its import on the scope of the property based Second Amendment right.
Specifically, takings law teaches that destroying a single stick from the bundle does in itself
not constitute a taking. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979). Rather, the
232
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A large percentage of Second Amendment cases arise under Section 922(g).244
Though Henderson cited neither Heller, McDonald, nor the Second Amendment,
it nevertheless has significant import on understanding the propertized Second
Amendment right.245 When the Court held that the government “conflate[d] the right
to possess a gun with another incident of ownership, which [§ 922(g)] does not
affect: the right merely to sell or otherwise dispose of that item,” it was arguably
suggesting that property principles inhere in the Second Amendment right.246
The Court reaffirmed that the Second Amendment plausibly contains propertylike principles in Caetano v. Massachusetts.247 In Caetano the Court vacated a
decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that held stun guns outside
the Second Amendment’s scope.248 In a two page order the Court explained the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court erred by viewing the case through a “contemporary lens,” which led it to misapply the “dangerous and unusual” test and
misread “Heller’s clear statement that the Second Amendment extends . . . to . . .
arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”249
Justice Alito wrote separately to further expound upon the Court’s “dangerous
and unusual” and “common use” tests.250 Alito clarified for the court below that
bundle must be viewed in the aggregate—as a whole. See id. This potentially has important
implications for a property based Second Amendment right. For example, some courts have
read Heller to mean the Second Amendment precludes complete bans. See, e.g., Heller II,
670 F.3d 1244, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“It follows from Heller’s
protection of semi-automatic handguns that semi-automatic rifles are also constitutionally
protected and that D.C.’s ban on them is unconstitutional.”); see also id. at 1285 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (“A ban on a class of arms is not an ‘incidental’ regulation. It is equivalent to
a ban on a category of speech.”). Of course, an important question for these courts is what
the scope of the Second Amendment entails. The Court’s recent decision in Caetano suggests
the Second Amendment may reach more than just handguns. See infra notes 247–54. If that
is true, then one could argue that possession of a semiautomatic rifle is but one stick in the
Second Amendment bundle. In that case, a law prohibiting possession or ownership (or both)
of a semiautomatic rifle may not be a violation. Because Henderson suggests a more
dynamic conception of the right to keep and bear arms, it could be that destroying but one
stick does not violate the Constitution.
244
See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 35, at 1481 (finding felon possession cases represented nearly one quarter of all Second Amendment litigation from when Heller was
decided in February 2016).
245
See Henderson, 135 S. Ct. at 1783.
246
Id. at 1785; see Sprankling, supra note 28, at 10 (observing that the Court’s decision
in Henderson makes the Second Amendment right to “keep and bear” arms “seem[ingly]
indistinguishable” from the traditional property interest that accords possession and ownership); see also MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 92, at 121 (“Possession is the most basic
property institution.”).
247
136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam).
248
Id. at 1027–28.
249
Id. at 1028.
250
Id. at 1030–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Heller expressly precludes “categorically prohibiting” firearms merely because they
are “dangerous.”251 His brief opinion reaffirmed that the right to keep and bear arms
is governed by “bright-line rule[s] subject to historically indicated exceptions whose
definition involves significant judicial discretion.”252 Aside from the property-like
principles that inhere in the Second Amendment, Alito’s characterization of the
Second Amendment right is identical to the analytical approach the Court announced
governed property rights in Lucas.253 Indeed, Alito’s characterization of the Second
Amendment’s “dangerous and unusual” test in Caetano is so similar to the Court’s
takings inquiry that it is “impossible to miss.”254
There are at least some property principles animating the Second Amendment.
The doctrine surrounding the right to keep and bear arms continues to develop,
presenting courts with opportunities to refine and sharpen it. Property-based doctrines could provide an informative source of decision rules as courts undertake such
efforts. However, there are other reasons why takings doctrine in particular could
be helpful. The next Section will address them.
C. Privileging History and Tradition
The precise role of history in constitutional interpretation is a rich debate. Few
would contend that history is useless; indeed, history has played an important role,
in some form, since the Constitution was drafted.255 Rather the disagreement circles
around a handful of questions that assume a role for history.256 Property rights and
the right to keep and bear arms are no exception. This Section will explore the role
history plays in the context of both constitutional rights in an attempt to show why
the takings doctrine could be an optimal source for courts to examine when deciding
sensitive places challenges under the Second Amendment.
Historical sources played a central role in the Heller and McDonald decisions.257
However, their precise role and significance in deciding future cases was never fully
explained.258 Indeed, courts and scholars continue to disagree on where history fits
in Second Amendment litigation, and how much weight it deserves.259 Nevertheless,
251

Id. at 1031.
Blocher, supra note 28, at 351.
253
Id. at 335.
254
Id. at 351.
255
See, e.g., PATRICK J. CHARLES, HISTORICISM, ORIGINALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE USE AND ABUSE OF THE PAST IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 1–31 (2014); Lorianne
Updike Toler, Joseph Cecere & Don Willett, Pre-“Originalism,”36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
277 (2013).
256
CHARLES, supra note 255, at 1.
257
Id. at 20.
258
See id.
259
See Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, Take
Three: Critiquing the Circuit Courts Use of History-in-Law, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 197, 198
252
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the Court emphasized in both decisions that history enjoys an elevated place in Second
Amendment doctrine.260
To be sure, when courts engage in a Second Amendment analysis, history and tradition play a privileged role in answering “any question concerning the right to keep
and bear arms.”261 However, the Heller and McDonald courts show that lower courts
have flexibility in their historical inquiry.262 Indeed, Justice Scalia cautioned that the
Court’s analysis in Heller was not “exhaustive,” and that gun regulations could be upheld under newly discovered “historical justifications.”263
In addition to history, Heller and McDonald made clear that tradition plays an
important role in defining the scope of the Second Amendment.264 Though there was
no discussion as to what qualifies, Heller used the word “longstanding” to describe the
types of regulations that are “presumptively lawful” under the Second Amendment.265
The use of “longstanding” in both cases indicates the importance of tradition to
frame the scope of the right.266 Though inquiries into tradition often “blend[] with
(2019) (“[M]uch of [Second Amendment] commentary centers on history-in-law; that is, the
study of how the law has evolved in a particular area, what events and factors caused the law
to evolve, and how—if at all—this history is important for the courts when adjudicating
constitutional questions.”). Compare Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1174–75
(9th Cir. 2014) (“In light of Heller, the Second Circuit erred in outright rejecting history and
tradition as unhelpful and ambiguous, and the Third and Fourth Circuits erred in following
suit.” (citation omitted)), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016), and Moore v. Madigan,
702 F.3d 933, 935–37 (7th Cir. 2012) (conducting a historical analysis and criticizing sister
courts that do not), with Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting a
historical inquiry because history does not “speak with one voice” and going straight to Step
Two), and Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Even if
we believed that we should look solely to this highly ambiguous history and tradition to determine the meaning of the [Second] Amendment, we would find that the cited sources do
not directly address the specific question before us [.]”). A recent empirical analysis of all
Second Amendment case law from Heller through January 2016 found, however, that “original historical analysis is not the sole driving force in Second Amendment cases.” Ruben &
Blocher, supra note 35, at 1491.
260
See Charles, supra note 259, at 206.
261
Id. at 202 (quoting Darrell A. H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 861–62 (2013)). For additional examples of what a historical analysis might look like in a Second Amendment context,
see, Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924–42 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Peterson
v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1207–12 (10th Cir. 2013).
262
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 803–04 (2010); Heller I, 554 U.S. 570,
626 (2008).
263
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 635; see also Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment
in Historiographical Crisis: Why the Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing
“Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1727, 1848–54 (2012) (discussing the “many” questions Justice Scalia’s call for historical analysis leaves open).
264
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 815–16; Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.
265
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
266
See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 130; see also Rostron, supra note 11, at
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arguments about history,” the Court was clear that it, too, plays an elevated role in
a court’s analysis.267
A “central” feature of Heller’s holding was the constitutional guarantee of selfdefense.268 Indeed, the Court noted that at the Second Amendment’s “core” is the common law right to defend one’s self—a right that pre-figures ratification.269 This right
was based in a common law background principle, one that was “fundamental,” “inherited from our English ancestors.”270 Justice Alito’s controlling opinion echoed
this basis in McDonald when he observed that this “fundamental” right is “deeply
rooted” in our “Nation’s history and tradition.”271 Thus, the Court signaled in both
instances in which it has interpreted the Second Amendment, that it constitutionalized
at least some of the right to self-defense at common law into the right to keep and
bear arms.272
715. For an example of how a court may rely upon tradition to assist its framing of the Second
Amendment right in a particular case, see United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (discussing the role of tradition in Heller’s “presumptively lawful” regulations).
267
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 132. As previously mentioned, the precise
weight to accord history and tradition is debated across the pages of the Federal Reporter and
law reviews across the country. Even at its most formal, though, adherents to a strict “text,
history, and tradition” approach still rely upon analogy or borrowing to settle cases. See, e.g.,
Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating
that both Heller and McDonald called for “a test based wholly on text, history, and tradition”
but also permitting reasoning by analogy for modern considerations).
268
Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1252.
269
See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–70; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. at 593, 628. For
additional discussion on the self-defense right that the Second Amendment guarantees, see
generally Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF.
L. REV. 63 (2020).
270
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 593, 599; cf. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 820 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230)) (describing
property rights as “fundamental”).
271
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767; cf. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897) (describing the property right protected by the Takings Clause as
“universal” and incorporating it onto the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
272
See Samuel C. Kaplan, Grab Bag of Principles” or Principled Grab Bag?: The Constitutionalization of Common Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 463, 466–67 (1998); David B. Kopel, The
Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235,
237–38 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1413 (2009) (“The majority . . . read the Second Amendment to
preserve the militia by codifying the common law right of self-defense, and declared that the
Amendment ‘elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens
to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”). While no one disputes whether the Court constitutionalized at least some common law, scholars debate the exact boundaries. Compare
David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of Guns, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 641, 641 (2008) (“The Court held that the Second Amendment gives individuals
a right not only to get a gun but also to use it for certain purposes, especially self-defense.
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Similarly, the Court has constitutionalized the common law into its takings
jurisprudence. Like sensitive places and other exceptions to the Second Amendment,
the nuisance exception analysis is based on the Court’s historical inquiry. Scalia found
the exception based upon “the historical inquiry recorded in the Takings Clause that
has become part of our constitutional culture.”273 Lucas constitutionalized the common law of nuisance when the Court held that if the challenged law “inheres . . . [in
the] background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance[,]” it is
constitutional.274 Specifically, these background principles “inhere in the title itself,”
meaning they were baked into the property when the owner purchased it.275 Thus,
the particular use had always been outside the scope of their rights.276 This doctrinal
move constitutionalized the common law of private and public nuisance into the
Takings Clause as an exception to an “immutable” right that—like the right to selfdefense—pre-figured ratification.277
As discussed, a regulatory takings analysis begins with history and tradition.278
At Step One the judge must determine whether the underlying property use was
traditionally within the owner’s property right or whether it was deemed a nuisance.
If the use is outside the owner’s right then the court will uphold the regulation. However, if the use is within the owner’s property right then the analysis proceeds to
Step Two: a multifactor test.279
And if the Constitution protects the right to use a gun for self-defense, then it follows that the
Constitution must also protect the underlying right to self-defense itself.”), with Darrell A.H.
Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1278 (2009) (showing Heller only constitutionalized the right to self-defense in the home).
273
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
274
Id. at 1029.
275
Id.
276
Federal courts have long deferred to state courts on questions of whether a particular
property interest exists. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 405, 435 (1977).
277
DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (Oct. 14, 1774)
(“[T]he inhabitants of the English Colonies in North-America, by the immutable laws of
nature. . . . are entitled to life, liberty and property.”); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *129 (describing “the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty,
and the right of private property” as the “natural libert[ies]”).
278
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
279
See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. If a case proceeds to “step two” of the
analysis then a court will consider the three Penn Central factors in making its determination.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The factors include (1)
the character of the government action, (2) the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner,
and (3) the regulation’s interference with the landowner’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations. Id. For examples of what this two-part takings analysis looks like in practice,
see Hendler v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 611 (1997) (ruling the government’s drilling of
wells on plaintiff’s property to assess groundwater contamination was not a taking as groundwater contamination was historically a nuisance under California law), aff’d, 175 F.3d 1374
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Colo. App. 1996)
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History and tradition are thus central to both takings and Second Amendment
analyses. The Court has shown that both rights have their respective common law
traditions at their core.280 Borrowing from a takings framework for the Second
Amendment both adheres to the analysis of history and tradition that Heller suggested, and provides judges with a more categorical, formalistic framework for Second
Amendment cases. Such a framework supports consistency in decisions and helps
legitimize the underlying doctrine by minimizing judicial discretion that can sometimes come with more flexible tests.281 However, such an analytical framework will
require an inquiry into the history and tradition of regulations governing self-defense
at common law. The next Section will briefly discuss that.
D. The Second Amendment’s Background Principles
This Section will briefly discuss the common law history and statutory tradition
that comprise the Second Amendment’s background principles. In addition to the
reasons already discussed, we know to look to such sources because the Court’s Second Amendment precedent tells us common law history and statutory tradition are
germane to sketching the scope of the Second Amendment right. In his concurring
opinion in McDonald, Justice Scalia stated that the “scope of the right” is shown not
by Blackstone’s musings, old dictionaries, or old newspaper clippings, but by “the traditional restrictions.”282 To the extent Justice Scalia is correct, a proper sensitive
places analysis should engage with the statutes and common law that traditionally
governed the right to keep and bear arms.
The common law is the “canvas on which our Founding Fathers drafted the Second
Amendment.”283 As demonstrated by subsequent litigation and scholarship, the Second
(finding no taking when a state environmental agency entered plaintiff’s mine to help a
federal agency move a detritus pile because, under principles of state nuisance law, the
plaintiffs had no property right to use the site in a way that created environmental harm); and
Brown v. Thompson, 979 P.2d 586, 595, 598 (Haw. 1999) (denying a takings claim challenge to a state impoundment of a sinking vessel because it was a public nuisance under
state’s common law).
280
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–70 (2010); Aztec Minerals, 940 P.2d
at 1032.
281
See Geoffrey Schotter, Diachronic Constitutionalism: A Remedy for the Court's Originalist Fixation, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1241, 1310 (2010); see also Heller I, 554 U.S. 570,
634 (2008) (“The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government . . . the
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A
constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”).
282
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 802 (Scalia, J., concurring). At least some federal courts have
subsequently interpreted Scalia’s opinion as prescribing an investigation into Second Amendment’s common law and statutory history. See, e.g., Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836
F.3d 336, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2016); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1151, 1156–66
(9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016).
283
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir. 2012).
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Amendment right recognized by Heller and McDonald has a robust history at common
law.284 In both cases, the majority analyzed writings from leading founding-era legal
thinkers and concluded that the right to arms during that period was “conceived of . . .
as necessary for self-defense.”285 But the right at that period was a common law
right.286 Indeed, though state constitutions provided for a right to arms, the precise
scope was defined by the common law—a legal tradition inherited from England.287
The common law tradition at the time both guaranteed and restrained the right.288
The legal regime that regulated the right at the founding and Reconstruction was
highly localized.289 The common law regimes at those times meant that the weapons
laws one was subject to looked different depending on where one lived.290 For example, generally speaking, the slave South in the Antebellum Era was governed by
a more permissive firearm regulatory regime than the one in New England.291 In fact,
most of the country viewed laws prohibiting arms in certain places (i.e., sensitive
places) as coexisting with the common law right the Heller and McDonald courts
read into the Second Amendment.292
The limits on the Second Amendment right were, historically, defined by the
legislature and enforced by justices of the peace, sheriffs, and constables.293 These
common law regulations governed where people could exercise their right.294 For
284

Kaplan, supra note 272, at 466–67; Kopel, supra note 272, at 237–38; Siegel, supra
note 272, at 1413.
285
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 606.
286
Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings
and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1144, 1148–49 (2006).
287
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
887 (1996); cf. James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years
After Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3, 5–6 (2008) (discussing the role the common law of both
nuisance and property play in defining the scope and content of property rights post-Lucas).
288
Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins
of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 501–02 (2004).
289
See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing
Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J.F. 121, 122–24 (2015).
290
Id.; WINKLER, supra note 145, at 163–65, 172–73 (discussing the strict gun laws in the
nineteenth century west).
291
Compare Ruben & Cornell, supra note 289, at 126–27, with WINKLER, supra note 145,
at 128–34.
292
See WINKLER, supra note 145, at 134; Cornell & DeDino, supra note 288, at 502–03;
Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public Carry and What It Tells
Us About Firearm Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 335, 353–58 (2018); see also SAUL
CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN
CONTROL IN AMERICA 29 (2006) (“The natural right of self-defense had evolved slowly into the
more limited right embodied in the common law. These changes reflected the accumulated
wisdom of countless judges who had struggled with the difficult task of balancing the right
of self-defense with the need to protect public safety.”).
293
Cornell & DeDino, supra note 288, at 502.
294
See, e.g., id. at 505; Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth
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example, early American towns such as Gloucester, Massachusetts recognized the
right to armed self-defense, but also observed that this right was subject to regulation through the common law and the state’s police power.295 Gloucester’s balanced
approach permitting the people to exercise their right, subject to specified locationbased exceptions, was typical of the common law tradition at the time.296
Common law regulations governing the right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense were most often enforced through the crime of affray.297 Due to the flexible,
evolving nature of common law reasoning affray has more than one definition.298
However, one leading founding-era legal thinker defined affray as an offense at
“common law . . . for persons to go or ride armed with dangerous weapons.”299
Liability was based upon multiple factors, including location (i.e., where the offender
was bearing arms), but also time and manner.300
The Alabama Supreme Court’s reasoning in Carwile v. State characterizes how
affray was applied in a location-based challenge in the nineteenth century.301 In
Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1507–08, 1512–13 (2014). The relationship
between the state’s ability to regulate firearms and the right the Court read into the Second
Amendment can be traced to the often-invoked Statute of Northampton. Indeed, Heller
discussed the Statute extensively. Its precise meaning and import are the subject of a robust
literature. See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, The Statute of Northampton by the Late Eighteenth
Century: Clarifying the Intellectual Legacy, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQ. 10, 10, 26–27
(2013) (criticizing Cornell and stating that the Statute played a significant role influencing
perceptions of what constituted permissive public carriage of arms in the eighteenth century),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2256081 [https://perma.cc/MKL9-Z2GG]; Saul Cornell, The Right
to Carry Firearms Outside the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities,
39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1696, 1707–19 (2012) (concluding that the Statute was subject
to several interpretations that could have resulted in a “range of views” as to its prosecutorial
scope in the eighteenth century); David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards
of Review for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1127 (2010)
(reading the scope of the Statute’s historical restrictions narrowly and of limited import).
Scholarly consensus suggests the Statute was at least persuasive in shaping common law
arms regulations in the founding era. See Cornell, supra, at 1707–19; Patrick J. Charles, The
Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, Take Two: How We Got Here and Why
It Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 391–92 (2016).
295
See Charles, supra note 103, at 34.
296
See id. at 35 n.183 (discussing and citing additional schemes).
297
Cornell & DeDino, supra note 288, at 501.
298
Id.
299
CHARLES JAMES, A NEW AND ENLARGED MILITARY DICTIONARY (1805); see also 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49; 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 87–95. Affray often included an additional element of causing “terror”
or “fear” in the people. E.g., id. at 487; JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE, FOR THE EASIER PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 147 (1683).
300
1 HAWKINS, supra note 299, at 491–92.
301
35 Ala. 392 (1860); see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, To the Terror of the People:
Public Disorder Crimes and the Original Public Understanding of the Second Amendment,
43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 61, 88 (2018) (discussing Carwile).
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Carwile, Zachariah Carwile challenged his affray conviction. Witnesses observed
Carwile defending himself with a knife against two other individuals—both armed.302
The question for the court was whether the field in which the fight took place was
a “public place” for the purposes of an affray offense.303 Though the opinion is a
mere two pages, the court was clearly engaged in a multifactorial analysis. Importantly, in reaching its affirmative conclusion, the court looked at how easily the field
could be seen from the street, how the relatively close proximity could potentially
entangle passersby, and how this could potentially result in collateral “terror.”304
Carwile’s analysis is typical.305 This suggests that at common law, the early right to
self-defense was subject to a flexible, evolving “context-bound judgment.”306
In addition to a tradition of common law regulation, the right to keep and bear
arms has a long history of statutory regulation. Indeed, states regulated the carriage and
use of firearms in particular places since before ratification.307 These laws often proscribed firearms in places that were commonly populated (e.g., markets and fairs),
where individuals could reasonably expect peace (e.g., schools, churches, and theaters),
or places that have a significant nexus to government operations (e.g., courthouses,
town halls, and polling locations).308 The exact locations that were subject to regulation
varied widely. Professor Joseph Blocher has observed that this regional tailoring was
a product of the unique characteristics that divide urban from rural areas.309
302

Carwile, 35 Ala. at 392.
Id. at 392–93; cf. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 465 (4th Cir. 2011)
(presenting the question of whether the park where Masciandaro was arrested is “sensitive
place” for the purposed of the Second Amendment).
304
See Carwile, 35 Ala. at 393–95. An additionally important feature of Carwile is its
express rejection of any requirement that Carwile intended to terrorize the people by
exercising his right to armed self-defense. See id. at 394 (“It must be admitted, that there was
no actual terror . . . . It is not so much the terror actually produced, as the liability of fighting
in a public place to produce it, which the law regards. Terror to the people is presumed from
the fighting in a public place.”). Reading an intentionality requirement into the common law
crime of affray is generally associated with a reading of legal history that favors gun rights.
See Mark Anthony Frassetto, Meritless Historical Arguments in Second Amendment Litigation, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531, 535 (2019). For an example of such a reading, see
Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 11, at 222, 228, 241–44.
305
See Frassetto, supra note 301, at 86–89 (discussing cases).
306
Cornell & DeDino, supra note 288, at 501.
307
Id. at 505; Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 113 (2013) (“Many
local regulations at the time echoed the Statute of Northampton’s focus on weapons possession in populated areas.”); Mark Anthony Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons Legislation
Up to the Early Twentieth Century 88–98 (Jan. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2200991 [https://perma.cc/WN2W-VMSB].
308
See Repository of Historical Gun Laws, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS LAW, https://web
.law.duke.edu/gunlaws/ [https://perma.cc/4FAT-5HPK] (search “Sensitive Places and Times”
as subject) (last visited Oct. 22, 2020).
309
See Blocher, supra note 307, at 91, 93–103; see also An Act to Prohibit the Discharging of Fire Arms in Certain Places Therein Named, chap. 170, § 1, 1866 Tex. Gen. Laws
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Consider some examples. In 1795, New Hampshire prohibited the use of firearms
on public roads.310 Relatedly, Indiana passed a law in 1855 prohibiting guns on trains.311
In 1870, Texas prohibited individuals from carrying firearms in churches, schools,
libraries, and at “social gathering[s]” and public assemblies.312 And in 1879 Missouri
made it “unlawful” for anyone to use any firearms within the “immediate vicinity” of
“any court house, church or building used for school or college purposes.”313 These
cursory examples show that states have historically subjected firearms to locationbased regulations.
As with any formalist test in constitutional law, boundary questions are inevitable. The Second Amendment is no different. The history and tradition that matters for
Second Amendment analysis is a mix of Anglo-American sources.314 This Section
endeavored to show that that particular mix would provide a rich universe of background principles for judges to rely upon. Importantly, these background principles
are a source the Court has stated demonstrate the “scope of the right.”315 Borrowing
from the Court’s takings doctrine would import a categorical rule to the Second
Amendment that is “derived from text, history, and tradition.”316 Such a move would
introduce a more rigorous categorical inquiry to Second Amendment analysis, enabling
judges to answer questions of law that are more familiar to them as opposed to
engaging in law office history or “history lite.”317
210 (expressly drawing the urban/rural divide by prohibiting firearms in every “city or town
in [the] State,” unless deemed an “outer town” by the legislature). Blocher notes that the
variation did not track a simple North-South divide, but rather the difference in how strict
regulations were tracked much closer to the urban/rural divide. See Blocher, supra note 307,
at 117. Nor was the distinction localized to northern states; some of the strictest gun
regulations in American history were in towns associated with the “wild” West. Id.
310
See An Act for Regulating the Militia Within This State, ch. 13, 1795 N.H. Laws 525.
311
1855 Ind. Laws, ch. 79.
312
An Act Regulating the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, ch. 46, § 1, 1870 Tex. Gen. Laws
63.
313
An Act to Prohibit the Discharge of Firearms in the Immediate Vicinity of Any Courthouse, Church or Building Used for School or College Purposes, § 1, 1879 Mo. Laws 90.
314
See Miller, supra note 261, at 910.
315
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 741, 802 (2010).
316
Brief of Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, N.Y. State
Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280) [hereinafter
Brief of Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Am.] (referring to the Court’s current nuisance exception doctrine).
317
See Martin S. Flaherty, Can the Quill be Mightier than the Uzi? History “Lite,” “Law
Office,” and Worse Meets the Second Amendment, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 663, 675 (2015)
(reviewing MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY) (“To channel
Brandeis, often the only cure for bad history is more history.”); David T. Hardy, Lawyers,
Historians, and “Law-Office History,” 46 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); cf. Blumm & Ritchie,
supra note 179, at 328 (“Adopting the threshold inquiry enables courts to avoid Penn Central
balancing—regarded by many legal observers as a “bewildering mess”—and reduce the amount
of information that they must process.”).
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IV. A NEW SENSITIVE PLACES TEST
The preceding Sections have discussed the what and the why; this Part will touch
on the how. Here I will briefly outline what a sensitive places analysis might look
like based on the takings doctrine.
A. The Framework
The first step of the existing Second Amendment “decision-making structure”
frames the scope of the right.318 In a location-based challenge the court is inquiring
as to whether the place at issue is “sensitive” such that it falls into Heller’s exception.
It is a categorical, threshold inquiry. If the location is sensitive, then the Second
Amendment right does not extend to that place, and the regulation is upheld. If the
place is not sensitive, then the regulation passes to a protection analysis, which asks
when and how can the right be regulated in the location at issue.319
Borrowing from the nuisance exception doctrine, a court would conduct the
“logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of” the plaintiff’s right to keep and bear
arms in the location at issue.320 To do this, the court must look to the state’s history
and tradition of weapons regulation to determine whether or not the challenged law
is of the kind that would have traditionally governed the right to keep and bear
arms.321 However, this formalist “text, history, and tradition” test is flexible enough
to accommodate new knowledge and circumstances.322
In Lucas, Scalia observed that traditional concerns—like safety—may justify new
regulations,323such as a prohibition on firearms inside civilian spacecraft. Importing
this dynamic feature of the Lucas test to the Second Amendment is likely an instance
318

BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 117.
See id. at 110.
320
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
321
See id. at 1030–31.
322
Brief of Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Am., supra note 316, at 12 (discussing Lucas’s nuisance
exception test as “text, history, and tradition” focused); see also Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244,
1276 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (referring to reasoning by analogy from
history and tradition as the “proper interpretive approach”).
323
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022–23; see also Starship, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/ve
hicles/starship [https://perma.cc/6PQX-4L3J] (last visited Oct. 22, 2020). Justice Scalia similarly
shed light on how to analogize modern situations and conduct to historical understandings of
a constitutional right in Jones. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion was highly skeptical of the idea
that the Fourth Amendment, as it was “originally understood,” could be analogized to determine whether placing a GPS tracking device on a car constitutes a search. See United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 419–21 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]t is almost impossible to think
of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case.”). Scalia responded in the majority opinion by analogizing the facts in Jones to a historical scenario he
observed “is not far afield”: “a constable’s concealing himself in the target’s coach in order
to track its movements.” Id. at 406 n.3 (majority opinion). The relevant similarity he focused
on was the effect of the government action on the challenger. This example, in addition to his discussion in Lucas, could assist courts in calibrating an analogy in the sensitive places context.
319
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of both substantive and methodological borrowing, as it falls towards the middle of
the borrowing continuum.324 Though Heller suggests courts should emphasize history
and tradition (methodological) in their analyses, it implies they may consider
contemporary factors (substantive), as well.325 Thus, the Second Amendment has at
least some airspace for a doctrinal move like the one I propose here.
One of Heller’s many lessons is that the precise role of historical inquiry is an
open question subject to much debate.326 Though the nuisance exception-type analysis
slightly constrains the ability of parties to misuse history, familiar challenges that
attend history-in-law nevertheless remain.327 One possible solution would be to rely
only on consensus history of the relevant Second Amendment background principles
when conducting the analysis.328 Under this methodology, the sources would be those
that have garnered historical consensus, rather than sources with competing accounts.329
But history is not dispositive in a takings or Second Amendment analysis. Both
Heller and Lucas make clear there are additional considerations.330 In Lucas, Justice
Scalia observed that, in addition to the jurisdiction’s background principles, courts will
“ordinarily” look to the (1) risk of harm to surrounding property; (2) suitability of
the plaintiff’s use to the location at issue; and (3) balance of the difficulty to the
plaintiff versus the state to avoid the harm.331 A sensitive places inquiry would similarly consider additional factors. Consider again the analysis in some of the recent
sensitive places cases.
In GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Army Corps. of Engineers, the Eleventh Circuit
implied that the factors important in a sensitive places analysis include the particular
geographical details—like how large and readily accessible the place is to the
public—how frequently people visit the place, and its national security implications.332
324
See Charles, supra note 83, at 12–21 (discussing the distinction between substantive
and methodological borrowing and that it is best understood as a continuum rather than a
dichotomy).
325
See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 88–89, 144–46; FRANKS, supra note 222,
at 72–73; SEGALL, supra note 72, at 144–45; WINKLER, supra note 145, at 285–86 (discussing
how Heller used history and tradition as well as modern considerations in its analysis).
326
See Miller, supra note 261, at 852.
327
See id. at 876–86, 907–17.
328
See Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional Legitimacy—
Symposium: History and Meaning of the Constitution, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 48 (2014)
(defining and discussing consensus history). Consensus history is preferred to conflicting
history because such a method is ripe for abuse. See id.; see also McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 803–04 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling for a historical inquiry
that is based on bodies of evidence that are “less subjective”).
329
See Charles, supra note 328, at 48.
330
In addition to affirming that the Court’s historical analysis was not exhaustive, Justice
Scalia incorporated additional, non-historical considerations into his analysis of whether the
laws at issue were unconstitutional. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) (resting the
Court’s holding on the current popularity of the modern handgun).
331
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030–31 (1992).
332
788 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 2015); cf. Carwile v. State, 35 Ala. 392 (1860).

202

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:161

Similarly, in Class, the D.C. Circuit expressed that a sensitive places inquiry might
consider the types of individuals who frequent the place.333 And in DiGiacinto the
Virginia Supreme Court stated that a proper sensitive places inquiry might, in
addition to history and tradition, consider whether the place at issue typically features
large numbers of people who reasonably expect peace and safety.334
A distilled version of the test I propose looks like this:

Step One

Step Two

A. The court will first look to Second Amendment background principles, including both the particular state’s
historical statutes and judge-made law.335
B. If the court is unable to find consensus sources in its
historical inquiry into the background principles, or in
addition to that inquiry, the court will “ordinarily”336
consider additional factors, such as:
1. How large and readily accessible the place is to
the public;
2. Whether the place poses national security concerns;
3. How often people frequent the place;
4. The types of individuals that frequent the place
(e.g., children); or
5. Whether the place typically features large numbers
of people with a reasonable expectation of peace
or safety.
A. If, after a principled and rigorous inquiry at Step
One, the Second Amendment right is found to extend to
the place at issue, then the analysis moves to Step Two.
This step typically involves the court applying some
form of scrutiny above rational basis to the government’s
justification for the law at issue.337

A test like the one briefly sketched here could provide courts with familiar legal,
rather than historical, tools to decide cases in a way that still adheres to Heller’s
prescription. One need not be a so-called “originalist” to analyze Second Amendment
333

930 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
DiGiacinto v. Rector and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (Va.
2011); see also S.B. v. Seymour Cmty. Schs., 97 N.E.3d 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding
no Second Amendment violation when school system prohibited plaintiff from bringing an
AK-47 to school because it would violate the expectation of peace and safety that reasonably
attend school grounds).
335
See supra Section III.D.
336
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
337
See supra note 19 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 279 and accompanying text.
334
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questions in line with the Court’s jurisprudence. Though the Court decided the case
according to what it stated was the Amendment’s original public meaning, the Court
cautioned that its historical analysis was not exhaustive, and that subsequent cases
might further our understanding of the right’s full scope.338 Thus, the Court made
clear that original meaning was important, but that historical practice is the North
Star of a proper Second Amendment analysis. And “[h]istorical practice is not quite
the same as originalism, either, because it frequently looks to what has happened in
the generations after a text was originally written.”339 By borrowing from a familiar,
more developed area of constitutional jurisprudence that guarantees a similar right,
courts could foster the informed development of Second Amendment doctrine.
B. How Might the Test Work?
With the preceding Section’s outline in mind, this Section will now discuss its
application. To see what the framework could look like in action, consider a brief
example. Many states prohibit firearms in public transportation facilities, such as a
metro station.340 Analyzing a challenge to such a regulation could work as follows:
The first question for a court is whether the metro station is “sensitive” for the
purposes of the Second Amendment. The initial burden falls on the government to
show the regulation is lawful because it falls into Heller’s location-based exception.341 The question that guides that showing is whether or not the jurisdiction’s
background principles would have made it unlawful for the plaintiff to carry a firearm
in a metro station in 1868.342 Thus, at Step One, the burden falls on the government
338

Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019); see also
Charles, supra note 294, at 226 (“[O]riginalism is not history. It is a fact that originalism’s
chief proponents openly concede.”).
340
See, e.g., 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1(c)(1.5) (2020) (making it a felony to knowingly
carry or possess “any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm” in a “public transportation facility”).
341
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27 n.26. This burden sequence proceeds according to how
many courts currently preside over Second Amendment cases—it is descriptive. Perhaps
subsequent research will examine whether such a scheme is doctrinally proper or normatively
desirable.
342
Whether the correct guidepost for a historical inquiry in a challenge to a state or local
ordinance is 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified) or 1791 (when the Second
Amendment was ratified) is an ongoing debate, particularly among originalist scholars. See
Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the scope of the right in
1791 but considering late nineteenth century sources), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th
Cir. 2016); Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen state- or local-government action
is challenged, the focus of the original-meaning inquiry is carried forward in time; the Second
Amendment’s scope as a limitation on the States depends on how the right was understood when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified [in 1868].”); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E.
Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was
Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 7, 15 (2008) (looking to state constitutional rights in 1868 to understand unenumerated
339
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to show that a metro station is “sensitive”—i.e., outside the plaintiff’s Second Amendment right.343
As discussed, the government can accomplish this by establishing that the state’s
Second Amendment background principles deemed going armed in a metro station
outside the scope of the Second Amendment right. One important question when
analyzing historical evidence is what level of generality or tailoring controls the
inquiry.344 For the framework I propose, litigants and courts might consider the Fifth
Circuit’s approach in National Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, &
Tobacco.345 There, the court found a federal regulation that prohibited firearm access
and purchases by persons under twenty-one years old was outside the scope of the
Second Amendment at Step One.346 To frame the level of abstraction for its historical
analysis, the court read nineteenth century evidence, such as court decisions and
treatises, at both the general and granular level.347 The court found the law was
outside the scope of the right at both levels of abstraction.348 It framed the law as an
“age and safety bound restriction[]” (more granular) as well as “targeting select groups’
ability to access and use arms for the sake of public safety” (more general).349
Returning to our hypothetical, the law prohibiting arms in a metro station could
be framed as a restriction on arms in transportation stations (more granular) as well
as a prohibition on arms in locations that feature tight quarters and are often crowded
(more general).350 However, as Justice Scalia observed in both Heller and Lucas,
history and tradition are not dispositive in either Second Amendment or takings
analysis.351 Thus, if a public transportation facility is not expressly mentioned in a
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1099–1100 (1995) (discussing whether the
1868 understanding of the Establishment Clause is controlling). Without endorsing one side
of that debate, I will adopt 1868 as the appropriate marker for the purposes of this hypothetical.
343
Cf. supra notes 181–83 (describing Step One in a takings challenge).
344
See Miller, supra note 261, at 922–25; Jay Tidmarsh, The English Fire Courts and the
American Right to Civil Jury Trial, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1893, 1929 (2016).
345
700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1196 (2014).
346
Id. at 204.
347
See id. at 203.
348
Id. at 204.
349
Id. at 203.
350
However even this approach can present challenges for some modern social developments. But Justice Scalia provided some guidance for courts to navigate such scenarios. In
both Lucas (the nuclear power plant) and Jones (a GPS tracking device), Scalia showed how
to calibrate an analogy in a way that respects the underlying right as well as places an
emphasis on history and tradition. The path laid by Scalia in both these cases could assist
courts when they encounter challenges as to how to calibrate an analogy or to read a state’s
Second Amendment background principles in the face of such technological or social
developments. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
351
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008).
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historical decision or statute because, for example, there was no public transportation in the jurisdiction until the twentieth century, then the government can also meet
its Step One burden by showing that the various additional factors, such as the national
security implications of the place, indicate the place is “sensitive.”
The factors in Lucas were specific to nuisance, but factors in the test I propose
here might look like those the DiGiacinto, GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Army Corps. of
Engineers, and Class courts applied. These factors do not look so different from the
Lucas factors. Thus, a court might consider how close the place is to important government infrastructure or whether the location typically carries a presumption of peace
and tranquility. Such factors might, like the Court’s nuisance exception inquiry, help
determine whether carrying arms in the particular place is within or outside the
plaintiff’s Second Amendment right. If the government is able to meet its burden,
and show that the metro station is sensitive at Step One—either by establishing state
background principles, via additional factors, or both—then the inquiry ends, and the
law is upheld.
However, if the government is unable to show any Second Amendment background principles indicate the place at issue was traditionally outside the Second
Amendment right, and the additional factors are either not implicated or disfavor the
law at issue, then the inquiry moves to Step Two. Importing the Lucas test to the
Second Amendment would help ensure judges engage in a more rigorous and nuanced
analysis. Thus, courts only reach Step Two after a meaningful and principled inquiry
at Step One.
In the takings context, if a nuisance exception is found to lack support in a state’s
background principles, then the regulation is subject to a balancing test. In the Second
Amendment context, the existing two-part framework already provides for similar
analysis at Step Two. The scrutiny applied at Step Two, though, is arguably more
respective of the underlying right than takings doctrine, as courts apply some form of
heightened scrutiny to weapons regulations, as opposed to a “freestanding ‘interestbalancing’ approach” as is applied in takings cases under Penn Central.352 At Step
Two, courts generally require the government make a strong showing that the regulation “reasonably advances some important or legitimate government interest.”353
To calibrate its scrutiny analysis, a court will generally look to the burden on the
plaintiff’s right imposed by the inability to carry a firearm in a metro station. It will
352

Heller I, 554 U.S. at 634–35; see also Gary Lawson, Katharine A. Ferguson &
Guillermo Montero, “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the
Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 32–33,
37–38 (2005) (describing Penn Central test and criticizing as not being protective enough
of property rights).
353
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 17, at 110; see also Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of
Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
489, 512–13 (2012); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Heller I, 554 U.S.
570 (2008) (No. 07-290) (suggesting courts apply “heightened” scrutiny).
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also consider the government’s justification supporting the regulation.354 Thus, the
burden would shift to the government to produce evidence supporting its contended
purpose behind the regulation, and the evidence would be analyzed according to the
level of scrutiny determined by the burden the law imposed on the plaintiff’s right.355
C. Evaluating the Borrowing
This Section will briefly evaluate the borrowing I propose. It will examine
whether using the Court’s takings doctrine as a source for courts to analyze sensitive
places challenges could be a successful instance of borrowing.356
As previously discussed,357 since the Court decided Heller and McDonald propertylike principles have plausibly been a part of Second Amendment jurisprudence. That
is to say, there is some “synergy” between the Court’s Fifth Amendment and Second
Amendment doctrines.358 Moreover, this relationship between property rights and the
right to keep and bear arms is recognized by scholars, practitioners, and judges alike.359
354
Of course, there is much discussion about whether the two-part framework is even
workable. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (referring to
the framework as a quagmire). Similar criticisms attend the Court’s Penn Central test, as
well. See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, Inverse Condemnation Litigation in the 1990s—The
Uncertain Legacy of the Supreme Court’s Lucas and Yee Decisions, 43 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 85, 118 (1993) (“Takings jurisprudence was a muddle before the Supreme
Court handed down Yee and Lucas, and a muddle it remains.”). However, if one takes Justice
Scalia, in addition to others advocating for a formalist conception of constitutional interpretation,
at their word then a doctrinal test can adhere to the text, history, and tradition readings of
Heller and Lucas and include some form of balancing. See Joseph Blocher, Rights as Trumps
of What?, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 120, 132 (2019); Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization
of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other
Second Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1205, 1240 n.175 (2009).
355
See supra Section IV.B. As discussed, the scrutiny prong—Step Two—of the existing
decision-making structure is the subject of much debate by scholars, judges, and practitioners
across the ideological spectrum. One important feature of that debate is whether the judiciary is
best equipped to assess a legislature’s policy analysis. If the people’s elected officials marshal
evidence and find firearms are best kept outside public transportation facilities, should judges be
able to second-guess their work? Of course, this question pervades all of constitutional law.
356
For a less successful instance of borrowing see Laurin, supra note 193, at 672–76,
730–41 and Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Notes on Borrowing and Convergence, 111
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 140, 142–44 (2011).
357
See supra Section III.B.
358
See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 186, at 495.
359
See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 28, at 372 n.352 (comparing plaintiff success rates in
Second Amendment challenges to those in takings challenges); id. at 312–13, 317–18, 343–51;
Symposium, Heller in the Lower Courts, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 399, 419–22 (2018) (discussing
takings as a likely analog for Second Amendment challenges); Nicholas Johnson, Administering
the Second Amendment: Law, Politics, and Taxonomy, 50 SANTA CLARA L.REV.1263,1273–74
(2010) (proposing the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence as a doctrinal model for the hard
analytical questions Heller and McDonald left unanswered); Brief of Second Amendment
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Indeed, some originalist scholars contend that the most “plausible”360 historical source
for the Second Amendment is a jurisdiction’s common law tradition—the same
source used in Lucas’s nuisance exception test.
This makes a great deal of sense. First, both rights are fundamental, natural
rights that prefigure the Constitution’s drafting.361 Second, borrowing to inform
nascent Second Amendment doctrine has two practical bases. One, Heller endorsed
such a move when the Court looked to the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments to
frame and rationalize its decision.362 Two, because Second Amendment doctrine is
so underdeveloped, it is ripe for an infusion from another more developed area of
the Constitution.363 The Takings Clause could be one such source. The Court’s doctrine
in this area has existed for almost two centuries, which has allowed the doctrine to
percolate and benefit from the accumulation of voices and precedents over time.364
Additionally, a propertized Second Amendment is similarly endorsed by justices of
varying ideological views.365 Thus, borrowing from takings is not thrusting a onesided doctrinal test onto the right to keep and bear arms.
However, a successful import of the takings clause would require the judge be
“open and notorious” in their borrowing from the Fifth Amendment.366 They might
begin their analysis by observing their inquiry into a state’s background principles
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 22, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280).
360
See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1354 (2009). Any historical analysis endeavoring to interpret a constitutional provision’s meaning or how it was understood must look to the common law. See Kunal
M. Parker, Law “In” and “As” History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 1 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. POL’Y 587 (2011); Toler et al., supra note 255.
361
See Larkin, supra note 113, at 3 (citing JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (3d ed. 2008)); see
also Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 592, 612 (2008) (referring to the Second Amendment right as
the “pre-existing” “natural right of self-defense”).
362
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as being based on Heller’s commitment to history and tradition, a commitment shared
by the Court’s well-established and longstanding takings doctrine. Judge Scirica’s
opinion in Marzzarella is instructive.367 His import from the First Amendment’s twopart analytical structure was “open and notorious.”368 He cites to some of the Court’s
First Amendment cases, and discusses how that doctrine’s structure frames his
analysis.369 A judge would adopt a similarly transparent approach in borrowing from
the Court’s takings doctrine.
As previously discussed, Second Amendment doctrine is underdeveloped.370 Lower
courts have only just taken their “first steps” in developing Second Amendment jurisprudence.371 Borrowing from the Court’s takings doctrine is meant to support and
further that development.372 Finally, because current Second Amendment doctrine
is largely the product of borrowing—from the Supreme Court as well as courts
below—the right is likely more conducive to successful borrowing than others.373
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
No instance of borrowing is perfect. However, I caution the reader to consider
that this Article’s contribution is intended for the judicial—not aspirational—Second
Amendment.374 There are legitimate arguments as to why the Takings Clause in
367
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Amendment—the one judges read when they settle cases presenting a question regarding the
constitutional right versus the one referred to in common discourse—as being driven largely
by public interest groups. See Adam Winkler, Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?,
93 IND. L.J. 253, 257–61 (2018); see also DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF
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“dusty” Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to bear arms); MICHAEL
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general and nuisance exception in particular make for an imperfect doctrine to import
to the Second Amendment. This Part will attempt to address them.
One criticism might focus on the text of the two constitutional provisions.
Recall, the Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.”375 The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, that “[P]rivate
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”376
Thus, one might find that “infringed” and “taken” are too linguistically distinct
to support an instance of borrowing. But any criticisms based upon the text likely
fall away after considering the interpretation that surrounds the text. It is a truism
of constitutional law that very few individual rights are read literally. Certainly, the
Takings Clause and Second Amendment fall outside the subset of literal readings.
Heller made clear that the Second Amendment’s guarantee that the right “shall not
be infringed” does not mean cannot be regulated.377 A distinct feature of Heller’s
holding is that there is play in the text’s joints to regulate or restrict the right.
The Fifth Amendment’s text is similarly pliable. The Takings Clause reads:
“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”378
But the Court’s takings doctrine makes clear that “taken” is flexible enough to allow
the government to regulate a property owner’s use without triggering compensation.379 Despite the plain text implying all takings trigger compensation, its interpretation counsels otherwise.380 Thus, both constitutional provisions accord a level of
elasticity that does not foreclose borrowing from one to inform the other due to the
level of protection the provisions confer on their respective rights.381
Another text-based critique would center on the Takings Clause’s “just compensation” phrase.382 The argument might be that because a violation expressly calls for
damages, whereas the Second Amendment does not, the framers clearly viewed the
375
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381
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rights as sufficiently different such that borrowing is not permissible. However, the
history of the Second Amendment right the Heller Court conceived of indicates
otherwise. Federal courts have found that “[t]he Founding Fathers placed the right
to private property upon the highest of pedestals, standing side by side with the right
to personal security that underscores the Second Amendment.”383 Further, research
by Professor Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino suggests the right to keep and bear
arms at the founding may have actually been subordinate to the property right, as,
for example, some state constitutions exempted arms from their takings provisions.384
Thus, though the text may infer otherwise, history shows that the rights the two
provisions guarantee are at least coordinate.
Still another critic might argue that if any property principles exist in the Second
Amendment, they are specific rather than general. Meaning, to the extent that the
Second Amendment contains property-like principles, those principles are restricted
to the protection the Amendment confers on a particularized form of property—i.e.,
chattels, and handguns in particular. And because the Takings Clause applies to
general property interests, it is a poor source for borrowing.385
But to the extent that criticism carries any weight, it has been answered by the
courts. Indeed, courts have held that the Second Amendment does not protect the
right to a specific weapon.386 Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that though
Heller’s holding was centered around firearms—and handguns in particular—its subsequent decision in Caetano confirmed that the sweep of Second Amendment “arms”
is more capacious. Handguns are but one stick in the Second Amendment bundle.
Though the precise boundaries are less than clear, under current case law, “arms”
for the purposes of constitutional protection extends beyond handguns.387 In that
sense, then, there is no clear line to what is deserving of protection and what is not.
As Professor Sprankling has argued, the Second Amendment is more akin to a general
383
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property right, like the Fifth Amendment, than a specific property right like, say, the
Fourth Amendment’s protection of “houses, papers, and effects.”388
This Part endeavored to identify and address some of the more likely counterarguments to the claims made in this Article. To the extent I addressed those arguments, the framework I advance here is still by no means a panacea. Rather, I sought
to show that the Supreme Court provided lower courts few tools to apply Heller’s
novel holding in future challenges to location-based weapons laws. Subsequent cases
evince courts’ struggles. However, all is not lost. This Article attempted to show that
courts have existing doctrinal tools available to them that accord with Second
Amendment precedent and provide a more rigorous way to examine such cases by
way of more familiar doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Lower courts’ current approach to analyzing sensitive places challenges in Second
Amendment litigation is inconsistent, lacks nuance, and is wholly consistent with
Heller. Fortunately, the doctrinal tools to ameliorate this discontinuity already exist.
The test I propose recognizes the limits of the Court’s current Second Amendment
doctrine and the challenges it presents for lower courts, as well as the potential solutions
more established areas of constitutional law present. Second Amendment doctrine
can be better, and this Article sketches a path forward in an attempt to show how.
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